Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Moury,Catherine
Data de Publicação: 2009
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0873-65292009000100007
Resumo: In this article, I look at the dialectic between parties and government to understand the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement. I first observe that considering the coalition agreement as a contract written by the parties for the government to avoid “agency losses” is an oversimplification. In almost all cases the main ministers have participated in the negotiations, with, or as, party leaders. I also observe that the government follows to a large extent the coalition agreement in Belgium and in the Netherlands and also, although to a lesser extent in Italy, in where the coalition agreement are drafted before the elections. Moreover, if ministers have to fulfil the coalition agreement, they will do it better if they have participated in its draft. The transfer of the program only tells one part of the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement: measuring the proportion of ministerial decision based on the coalition agreement is also significant. The results of this measurement enlighten once more the importance of the coalition agreement for ministers, as at least one third (and up to two thirds) of the governmental bills originate in the coalition agreement. We observe much more variation on this second dimension and the crucial variable explaining a high proportion of agreement-based decisions is the absence of party leaders in the government. This finding suggests that party leaders will tend to accept more non agreement-based ministerial initiatives when they are themselves ministers.
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spelling Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreementparty governmentcoalitionBelgiumItalyThe NetherlandsFuzzy setsIn this article, I look at the dialectic between parties and government to understand the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement. I first observe that considering the coalition agreement as a contract written by the parties for the government to avoid “agency losses” is an oversimplification. In almost all cases the main ministers have participated in the negotiations, with, or as, party leaders. I also observe that the government follows to a large extent the coalition agreement in Belgium and in the Netherlands and also, although to a lesser extent in Italy, in where the coalition agreement are drafted before the elections. Moreover, if ministers have to fulfil the coalition agreement, they will do it better if they have participated in its draft. The transfer of the program only tells one part of the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement: measuring the proportion of ministerial decision based on the coalition agreement is also significant. The results of this measurement enlighten once more the importance of the coalition agreement for ministers, as at least one third (and up to two thirds) of the governmental bills originate in the coalition agreement. We observe much more variation on this second dimension and the crucial variable explaining a high proportion of agreement-based decisions is the absence of party leaders in the government. This finding suggests that party leaders will tend to accept more non agreement-based ministerial initiatives when they are themselves ministers.Editora Mundos Sociais2009-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0873-65292009000100007Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas n.59 2009reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttp://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0873-65292009000100007Moury,Catherineinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2024-02-06T17:10:44Zoai:scielo:S0873-65292009000100007Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T02:22:09.189430Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
title Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
spellingShingle Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
Moury,Catherine
party government
coalition
Belgium
Italy
The Netherlands
Fuzzy sets
title_short Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
title_full Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
title_fullStr Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
title_full_unstemmed Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
title_sort Coalition government and party mandate: explaining ministerial room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the coalition agreement
author Moury,Catherine
author_facet Moury,Catherine
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Moury,Catherine
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv party government
coalition
Belgium
Italy
The Netherlands
Fuzzy sets
topic party government
coalition
Belgium
Italy
The Netherlands
Fuzzy sets
description In this article, I look at the dialectic between parties and government to understand the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement. I first observe that considering the coalition agreement as a contract written by the parties for the government to avoid “agency losses” is an oversimplification. In almost all cases the main ministers have participated in the negotiations, with, or as, party leaders. I also observe that the government follows to a large extent the coalition agreement in Belgium and in the Netherlands and also, although to a lesser extent in Italy, in where the coalition agreement are drafted before the elections. Moreover, if ministers have to fulfil the coalition agreement, they will do it better if they have participated in its draft. The transfer of the program only tells one part of the extent to which ministers are bound by the coalition agreement: measuring the proportion of ministerial decision based on the coalition agreement is also significant. The results of this measurement enlighten once more the importance of the coalition agreement for ministers, as at least one third (and up to two thirds) of the governmental bills originate in the coalition agreement. We observe much more variation on this second dimension and the crucial variable explaining a high proportion of agreement-based decisions is the absence of party leaders in the government. This finding suggests that party leaders will tend to accept more non agreement-based ministerial initiatives when they are themselves ministers.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009-01-01
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://scielo.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0873-65292009000100007
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora Mundos Sociais
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Editora Mundos Sociais
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas n.59 2009
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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