The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
Resumo: | The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect |
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The effects of official and unofficial information on tax complianceTax Morale Experiment Peer Effects.InformationTax EvasionExperiment Peer EffectsThe administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effectBanco de PortugalRepositório da Universidade de LisboaGarcia, FilomenaOpromolla, Luca DavidVezzulli, AndreaMarques, Rafael2022-03-29T13:27:31Z2018-042018-04-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946engGarcia, Filomena … [et al.] .2018. “The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance” . Banco de Portugal. Economic - Research Department. Working Papers nº 9/2018.2182-0422info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:53:35Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/23946Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:08:05.939756Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
title |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
spellingShingle |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance Garcia, Filomena Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
title_short |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
title_full |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
title_fullStr |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
title_full_unstemmed |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
title_sort |
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
author |
Garcia, Filomena |
author_facet |
Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
topic |
Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
description |
The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-04 2018-04-01T00:00:00Z 2022-03-29T13:27:31Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Garcia, Filomena … [et al.] .2018. “The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance” . Banco de Portugal. Economic - Research Department. Working Papers nº 9/2018. 2182-0422 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Banco de Portugal |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Banco de Portugal |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131175151730688 |