Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886 |
Resumo: | Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors' relationship to our own hypothesis. |
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Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Othersinternational cooperation; international enforcement; political feasibility; treaties; U.S. foreign policyUnder what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors' relationship to our own hypothesis.Cogitatio2017-05-10info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/886Politics and Governance; Vol 5, No 2 (2017): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 79-922183-2463reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/886https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/886/886Copyright (c) 2017 Jon Hovi, Tora Skodvinhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHovi, JonSkodvin, Tora2022-10-21T16:03:52Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/886Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:13:47.619803Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
title |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
spellingShingle |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others Hovi, Jon international cooperation; international enforcement; political feasibility; treaties; U.S. foreign policy |
title_short |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
title_full |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
title_fullStr |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
title_full_unstemmed |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
title_sort |
Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others |
author |
Hovi, Jon |
author_facet |
Hovi, Jon Skodvin, Tora |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Skodvin, Tora |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Hovi, Jon Skodvin, Tora |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
international cooperation; international enforcement; political feasibility; treaties; U.S. foreign policy |
topic |
international cooperation; international enforcement; political feasibility; treaties; U.S. foreign policy |
description |
Under what conditions should we expect the United States to support international enforcement of treaties? We hypothesize that U.S. support is most likely for treaties where international enforcement will cause considerable (desired) behavioral change by other countries but little (undesired) behavioral change by the United States. Similarly, U.S. support is least likely for treaties where international enforcement will generate the converse effects. In developing this hypothesis, we derive specific conditions under which we should expect U.S. benefits of international enforcement to outweigh U.S. costs (or vice versa). We also provide empirical examples. Finally, we consider three alternative explanations of U.S. views on international enforcement—concern for U.S. sovereignty, desire to prevent infringements on U.S. constitutional protection of individual rights, and the usefulness of international enforcement as a domestic commitment device. We discuss these alternative explanatory factors' relationship to our own hypothesis. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-05-10 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886 oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/886 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886 |
identifier_str_mv |
oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/886 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/886 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i2.886 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/886/886 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Jon Hovi, Tora Skodvin http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Jon Hovi, Tora Skodvin http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Politics and Governance; Vol 5, No 2 (2017): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 79-92 2183-2463 reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799130591261622272 |