Strategic games in groundwater management
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2004 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10071/500 |
Resumo: | Previous work has shown that quality-quantity interactions may alter the typical results of private management under the assumption of myopic behavior. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the role of feedback strategies in a model containing an integrated quantity-quality approach, analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and shadow resource prices. The case of symmetric players is shown to yield results that are similar to those of models in previous literature, in that it establishes myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in between. However, as di¤erent water users do not have similar objectives or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric players. This paper shows that when agents are asymmetric, especially as regards external e¤ects, strategic solutions can be more extreme than the myopic ones. |
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Strategic games in groundwater managementFeedback Nash strategiesCommon property externalitiesGroundwater managementAsymmetric playersPrevious work has shown that quality-quantity interactions may alter the typical results of private management under the assumption of myopic behavior. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the role of feedback strategies in a model containing an integrated quantity-quality approach, analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and shadow resource prices. The case of symmetric players is shown to yield results that are similar to those of models in previous literature, in that it establishes myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in between. However, as di¤erent water users do not have similar objectives or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric players. This paper shows that when agents are asymmetric, especially as regards external e¤ects, strategic solutions can be more extreme than the myopic ones.Dinâmia2007-07-18T11:47:16Z2004-01-01T00:00:00Z2004info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/500eng10.7749/dinamiacet-iul.wp.2004.39Roseta-Palma, C.Brasão, A.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:50:30Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/500Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:24:56.101297Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
title |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
spellingShingle |
Strategic games in groundwater management Roseta-Palma, C. Feedback Nash strategies Common property externalities Groundwater management Asymmetric players |
title_short |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
title_full |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
title_fullStr |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
title_full_unstemmed |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
title_sort |
Strategic games in groundwater management |
author |
Roseta-Palma, C. |
author_facet |
Roseta-Palma, C. Brasão, A. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Brasão, A. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Roseta-Palma, C. Brasão, A. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Feedback Nash strategies Common property externalities Groundwater management Asymmetric players |
topic |
Feedback Nash strategies Common property externalities Groundwater management Asymmetric players |
description |
Previous work has shown that quality-quantity interactions may alter the typical results of private management under the assumption of myopic behavior. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the role of feedback strategies in a model containing an integrated quantity-quality approach, analyzing the impact on water use, pollution and shadow resource prices. The case of symmetric players is shown to yield results that are similar to those of models in previous literature, in that it establishes myopic and optimal solutions as extremes, with feedback solutions somewhere in between. However, as di¤erent water users do not have similar objectives or constraints, it is important to consider the case of asymmetric players. This paper shows that when agents are asymmetric, especially as regards external e¤ects, strategic solutions can be more extreme than the myopic ones. |
publishDate |
2004 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2004-01-01T00:00:00Z 2004 2007-07-18T11:47:16Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/500 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10071/500 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.7749/dinamiacet-iul.wp.2004.39 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Dinâmia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Dinâmia |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799134812030631936 |