On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Carmona, Guilherme
Data de Publicação: 2008
Outros Autores: Podczeck, Konrad
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577
Resumo: Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.
id RCAP_4a3def99c91c40275f7db5d7b73b6c6d
oai_identifier_str oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11577
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large gamesNash equilibriumPure strategiesApproximationEquilibrium distributionsOver the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.Nova SBERUNCarmona, GuilhermePodczeck, Konrad2014-03-13T11:35:36Z2008-032008-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T03:46:07Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/11577Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:20:23.862425Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
title On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
spellingShingle On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
Carmona, Guilherme
Nash equilibrium
Pure strategies
Approximation
Equilibrium distributions
title_short On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
title_full On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
title_fullStr On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
title_full_unstemmed On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
title_sort On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
author Carmona, Guilherme
author_facet Carmona, Guilherme
Podczeck, Konrad
author_role author
author2 Podczeck, Konrad
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Carmona, Guilherme
Podczeck, Konrad
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Nash equilibrium
Pure strategies
Approximation
Equilibrium distributions
topic Nash equilibrium
Pure strategies
Approximation
Equilibrium distributions
description Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-03
2008-03-01T00:00:00Z
2014-03-13T11:35:36Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11577
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799137845529542656

Registros relacionados