Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63552 |
Resumo: | The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p<1, altruistic punishment turns out to be detrimental for cooperation for a wide range of payoff parameters, when compared to the scenario without punishment. The results imply that while locally, the introduction of peer punishment may seem to reduce the chances of free-riding, realistic population structure may drive the population towards the opposite scenario. Hence, structured populations effectively reduce the expected beneficial contribution of punishment to the emergence of cooperation which, if not carefully dosed, may in fact hinder the chances of widespread cooperation. |
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Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costsAltruismConflict, PsychologicalHumansPunishmentRewardScience & TechnologyThe conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p<1, altruistic punishment turns out to be detrimental for cooperation for a wide range of payoff parameters, when compared to the scenario without punishment. The results imply that while locally, the introduction of peer punishment may seem to reduce the chances of free-riding, realistic population structure may drive the population towards the opposite scenario. Hence, structured populations effectively reduce the expected beneficial contribution of punishment to the emergence of cooperation which, if not carefully dosed, may in fact hinder the chances of widespread cooperation.This research was supported by FCT Portugal through grants PTDC/FIS/101248/2008, PTDC/MAT/122897/2010, SFRH/BD/77389/2011, SFRH/BPD/46393/2008 and multi-annual funding of CMAF-UL and INESC-ID (under the project PEst-OE/EEI/LA0021/2011) provided by FCT Portugal through PIDDAC Program funds. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.Public Library of Science (PLOS)Universidade do MinhoVukov, JeromosPinheiro, Flávio L.Santos, Francisco C.Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos20132013-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/63552engVukov J, Pinheiro FL, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2013) Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs. PLoS Comput Biol 9(1): e1002868. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.10028681553-734X,1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.100286823341764https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:22:00Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/63552Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:15:24.944027Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
title |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
spellingShingle |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs Vukov, Jeromos Altruism Conflict, Psychological Humans Punishment Reward Science & Technology |
title_short |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
title_full |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
title_fullStr |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
title_sort |
Reward from punishment does not emerge at all costs |
author |
Vukov, Jeromos |
author_facet |
Vukov, Jeromos Pinheiro, Flávio L. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pinheiro, Flávio L. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vukov, Jeromos Pinheiro, Flávio L. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Altruism Conflict, Psychological Humans Punishment Reward Science & Technology |
topic |
Altruism Conflict, Psychological Humans Punishment Reward Science & Technology |
description |
The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p<1, altruistic punishment turns out to be detrimental for cooperation for a wide range of payoff parameters, when compared to the scenario without punishment. The results imply that while locally, the introduction of peer punishment may seem to reduce the chances of free-riding, realistic population structure may drive the population towards the opposite scenario. Hence, structured populations effectively reduce the expected beneficial contribution of punishment to the emergence of cooperation which, if not carefully dosed, may in fact hinder the chances of widespread cooperation. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63552 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63552 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Vukov J, Pinheiro FL, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2013) Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs. PLoS Comput Biol 9(1): e1002868. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868 1553-734X, 1553-7358 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868 23341764 https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Public Library of Science (PLOS) |
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Public Library of Science (PLOS) |
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reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132600405590016 |