When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Wang, Xue
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Bohn, Frank, Veiga, Francisco José
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684
Resumo: Available online 17 October 2022.
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spelling When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?Debt illusionDeficitEgo rentFiscal policyPolitical budget cyclesPolitical economyCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoSocial SciencesD72E62H62Available online 17 October 2022.The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) databases of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, the Polity 5 database, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Freedom House, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database and Dalamagas’s (1992) research.We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.(undefined)ElsevierUniversidade do MinhoWang, XueBohn, FrankVeiga, Francisco José20232023-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684engWang, X., Bohn, F., & Veiga, F. J. (2023, March). When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?. European Journal of Political Economy. Elsevier BV. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.1023200176-268010.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320102320https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268022001239info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:45:18Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/84684Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:43:07.942007Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
title When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
spellingShingle When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
Wang, Xue
Debt illusion
Deficit
Ego rent
Fiscal policy
Political budget cycles
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
D72
E62
H62
title_short When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
title_full When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
title_fullStr When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
title_full_unstemmed When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
title_sort When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?
author Wang, Xue
author_facet Wang, Xue
Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
author_role author
author2 Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Wang, Xue
Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Debt illusion
Deficit
Ego rent
Fiscal policy
Political budget cycles
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
D72
E62
H62
topic Debt illusion
Deficit
Ego rent
Fiscal policy
Political budget cycles
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
D72
E62
H62
description Available online 17 October 2022.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2023-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/84684
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Wang, X., Bohn, F., & Veiga, F. J. (2023, March). When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?. European Journal of Political Economy. Elsevier BV. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320
0176-2680
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320
102320
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268022001239
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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