Political budget forecast cycles

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bohn, Frank
Data de Publicação: 2019
Outros Autores: Veiga, Francisco José
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687
Resumo: By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.
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spelling Political budget forecast cyclesOpportunistic political cyclesPolitical budget cyclesRevenue forecastsDeficitTransfersAsymmetric informationPolitical economyCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoBy forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT); UID/ECO/03182/2019Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoBohn, FrankVeiga, Francisco José20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687enghttps://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspxinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:28:41Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/61687Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:23:32.782576Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political budget forecast cycles
title Political budget forecast cycles
spellingShingle Political budget forecast cycles
Bohn, Frank
Opportunistic political cycles
Political budget cycles
Revenue forecasts
Deficit
Transfers
Asymmetric information
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short Political budget forecast cycles
title_full Political budget forecast cycles
title_fullStr Political budget forecast cycles
title_full_unstemmed Political budget forecast cycles
title_sort Political budget forecast cycles
author Bohn, Frank
author_facet Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
author_role author
author2 Veiga, Francisco José
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Opportunistic political cycles
Political budget cycles
Revenue forecasts
Deficit
Transfers
Asymmetric information
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic Opportunistic political cycles
Political budget cycles
Revenue forecasts
Deficit
Transfers
Asymmetric information
Political economy
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2019-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspx
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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