Costly horizontal differentiation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Correia-da-Silva, João
Data de Publicação: 2011
Outros Autores: Pinho, Joana
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672
Resumo: We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.
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spelling Costly horizontal differentiationCostly product differentiationSpatial competitionCollusionHotelling modelWe study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaCorreia-da-Silva, JoãoPinho, Joana2018-06-21T09:37:52Z2011-122011-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672engCorreia-da-Silva, João e Joana Pinho (2011). "Costly horizontal differentiation". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):165-1881617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-12T01:31:01Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15672Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:17.522211Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Costly horizontal differentiation
title Costly horizontal differentiation
spellingShingle Costly horizontal differentiation
Correia-da-Silva, João
Costly product differentiation
Spatial competition
Collusion
Hotelling model
title_short Costly horizontal differentiation
title_full Costly horizontal differentiation
title_fullStr Costly horizontal differentiation
title_full_unstemmed Costly horizontal differentiation
title_sort Costly horizontal differentiation
author Correia-da-Silva, João
author_facet Correia-da-Silva, João
Pinho, Joana
author_role author
author2 Pinho, Joana
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Correia-da-Silva, João
Pinho, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Costly product differentiation
Spatial competition
Collusion
Hotelling model
topic Costly product differentiation
Spatial competition
Collusion
Hotelling model
description We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-12
2011-12-01T00:00:00Z
2018-06-21T09:37:52Z
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Correia-da-Silva, João e Joana Pinho (2011). "Costly horizontal differentiation". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):165-188
1617-982X (print)
10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv metadata only access
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
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