Costly horizontal differentiation
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672 |
Resumo: | We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation. |
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Costly horizontal differentiationCostly product differentiationSpatial competitionCollusionHotelling modelWe study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation.Springer VerlagRepositório da Universidade de LisboaCorreia-da-Silva, JoãoPinho, Joana2018-06-21T09:37:52Z2011-122011-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672engCorreia-da-Silva, João e Joana Pinho (2011). "Costly horizontal differentiation". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):165-1881617-982X (print)10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4metadata only accessinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-12T01:31:01Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15672Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:01:17.522211Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
title |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
spellingShingle |
Costly horizontal differentiation Correia-da-Silva, João Costly product differentiation Spatial competition Collusion Hotelling model |
title_short |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
title_full |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
title_fullStr |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
title_sort |
Costly horizontal differentiation |
author |
Correia-da-Silva, João |
author_facet |
Correia-da-Silva, João Pinho, Joana |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pinho, Joana |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Correia-da-Silva, João Pinho, Joana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Costly product differentiation Spatial competition Collusion Hotelling model |
topic |
Costly product differentiation Spatial competition Collusion Hotelling model |
description |
We study the effect of quadratic differentiation costs in the Hotelling model of endogenous product differentiation. The equilibrium location choices are found to depend on the magnitude of the differentiation costs (relatively to the transportation costs supported by consumers). When the differentiation costs are low, there is maximum differentiation. When they are high, there is partial differentiation, with a degree of differentiation that decreases with the differentiation costs. In any case, the socially optimal degree of differentiation is always lower than the equilibrium level. We also study the case of collusion between firms. If firms can combine locations but not prices, they locate asymmetrically when differentiation costs are high and choose maximum differentiation when they are low. When collusion extends to price setting, there is partial differentiation. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-12 2011-12-01T00:00:00Z 2018-06-21T09:37:52Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15672 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Correia-da-Silva, João e Joana Pinho (2011). "Costly horizontal differentiation". Portuguese Economic Journal, 10(3):165-188 1617-982X (print) 10.1007/s10258-010-0066-4 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
metadata only access info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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metadata only access |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799131101307863040 |