Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Posada, Pedro
Data de Publicação: 2004
Outros Autores: Straume, Odd Rune
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849
Resumo: We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.
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spelling Merger, partial collusion and relocationSpatial competitionMergerRelocationPartial collusionWe set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.SpringerUniversidade do MinhoPosada, PedroStraume, Odd Rune2004-122004-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849eng"Journal of Economics". ISSN 0931-8658. 83:3 (Dec. 2004) 243-265.0931-8658http://www.springerlink.com/content/108909/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:44:54Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/6849Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:42:40.921583Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Merger, partial collusion and relocation
title Merger, partial collusion and relocation
spellingShingle Merger, partial collusion and relocation
Posada, Pedro
Spatial competition
Merger
Relocation
Partial collusion
title_short Merger, partial collusion and relocation
title_full Merger, partial collusion and relocation
title_fullStr Merger, partial collusion and relocation
title_full_unstemmed Merger, partial collusion and relocation
title_sort Merger, partial collusion and relocation
author Posada, Pedro
author_facet Posada, Pedro
Straume, Odd Rune
author_role author
author2 Straume, Odd Rune
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Posada, Pedro
Straume, Odd Rune
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Spatial competition
Merger
Relocation
Partial collusion
topic Spatial competition
Merger
Relocation
Partial collusion
description We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2004-12
2004-12-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv "Journal of Economics". ISSN 0931-8658. 83:3 (Dec. 2004) 243-265.
0931-8658
http://www.springerlink.com/content/108909/
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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