Political budget forecast cycles
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687 |
Resumo: | By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up. |
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Political budget forecast cyclesOpportunistic political cyclesPolitical budget cyclesRevenue forecastsDeficitTransfersAsymmetric informationPolitical economyCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoBy forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT); UID/ECO/03182/2019Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoBohn, FrankVeiga, Francisco José20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687enghttps://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspxinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:28:41Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/61687Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:23:32.782576Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Political budget forecast cycles |
title |
Political budget forecast cycles |
spellingShingle |
Political budget forecast cycles Bohn, Frank Opportunistic political cycles Political budget cycles Revenue forecasts Deficit Transfers Asymmetric information Political economy Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
title_short |
Political budget forecast cycles |
title_full |
Political budget forecast cycles |
title_fullStr |
Political budget forecast cycles |
title_full_unstemmed |
Political budget forecast cycles |
title_sort |
Political budget forecast cycles |
author |
Bohn, Frank |
author_facet |
Bohn, Frank Veiga, Francisco José |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Veiga, Francisco José |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bohn, Frank Veiga, Francisco José |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Opportunistic political cycles Political budget cycles Revenue forecasts Deficit Transfers Asymmetric information Political economy Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
topic |
Opportunistic political cycles Political budget cycles Revenue forecasts Deficit Transfers Asymmetric information Political economy Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
description |
By forecasting overly optimistic revenues opportunistic governments can increase spending in order to appear more competent prior to elections. Ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles - as also found for US states in the empirical literature. In our theoretical moral hazard model we obtain three additional results which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running; and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1822/61687 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.eeg.uminho.pt/pt/investigar/nipe/Paginas/publicacoes.aspx |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132710502924288 |