Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pais, Joana
Data de Publicação: 2008
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25826
Resumo: Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms act truthfully, every outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game
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spelling Incentives in decentralized random matching marketsMatching MarketsStabilityRandom MechanismsDecentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms act truthfully, every outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the gameElsevierRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, Joana2022-10-28T14:19:09Z20082008-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25826engPais, Joana.(2008)."Incentives in decentralized random matching markets". Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 64, No. 2: pp. 632-649.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:55:20Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/25826Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:09:34.740069Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
title Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
spellingShingle Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
Pais, Joana
Matching Markets
Stability
Random Mechanisms
title_short Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
title_full Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
title_fullStr Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
title_full_unstemmed Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
title_sort Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
author Pais, Joana
author_facet Pais, Joana
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pais, Joana
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Matching Markets
Stability
Random Mechanisms
topic Matching Markets
Stability
Random Mechanisms
description Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms act truthfully, every outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008
2008-01-01T00:00:00Z
2022-10-28T14:19:09Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25826
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/25826
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pais, Joana.(2008)."Incentives in decentralized random matching markets". Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 64, No. 2: pp. 632-649.
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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