On random matching markets: properties and equilibria
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626 |
Resumo: | We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its properties. In particular, different executions of the algorithm may lead to diferent output matchings. We then study incentives in the rev¬elation game induced by the algorithm. We prove that ordinal equilibria always exist. Furthermore, every matching that results from an equilibrium play of the game is stable for a particular preference profile. Namely, if an ordinal equilibrium exists in which firms reveal their true preferences, only matchings that are stable for the true preferences can be obtained. |
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On random matching markets: properties and equilibriaMatching MarketsStabilityRandom MechanismWe consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its properties. In particular, different executions of the algorithm may lead to diferent output matchings. We then study incentives in the rev¬elation game induced by the algorithm. We prove that ordinal equilibria always exist. Furthermore, every matching that results from an equilibrium play of the game is stable for a particular preference profile. Namely, if an ordinal equilibrium exists in which firms reveal their true preferences, only matchings that are stable for the true preferences can be obtained.ISEG – Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPais, Joana2010-12-07T16:11:20Z20062006-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626engPais, Joana. 2006. "On random matching markets: properties and equilibria". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 11-2006/DE/UECE0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:33:49Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/2626Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:50:36.208975Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
title |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
spellingShingle |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria Pais, Joana Matching Markets Stability Random Mechanism |
title_short |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
title_full |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
title_fullStr |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
title_full_unstemmed |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
title_sort |
On random matching markets: properties and equilibria |
author |
Pais, Joana |
author_facet |
Pais, Joana |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Matching Markets Stability Random Mechanism |
topic |
Matching Markets Stability Random Mechanism |
description |
We consider centralized matching markets in which, starting from an arbitrary match¬ing, firms are successively chosen in a random fashion and offer their positions to the workers they prefer the most. We propose an algorithm that generalizes some well-known algorithms and explore some of its properties. In particular, different executions of the algorithm may lead to diferent output matchings. We then study incentives in the rev¬elation game induced by the algorithm. We prove that ordinal equilibria always exist. Furthermore, every matching that results from an equilibrium play of the game is stable for a particular preference profile. Namely, if an ordinal equilibrium exists in which firms reveal their true preferences, only matchings that are stable for the true preferences can be obtained. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006 2006-01-01T00:00:00Z 2010-12-07T16:11:20Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2626 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pais, Joana. 2006. "On random matching markets: properties and equilibria". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 11-2006/DE/UECE 0874-4548 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG – Departamento de Economia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
ISEG – Departamento de Economia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799130981319311360 |