Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2001 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83532 |
Resumo: | This paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a tradeoff between joining a high-productivity type but a low-reputation partner. It is examined whether there are gains from trade, both, for the case of non-transferable and transferable utility, and what can be learned from reputation deals. Furthermore, a signaling model of teaming is developed that captures in a consistent way the process of information acquisition by the agents' strategic opponent, the market. |
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Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous TeamsEndogenous teamsReputationSignalingAdverse selectionThis paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a tradeoff between joining a high-productivity type but a low-reputation partner. It is examined whether there are gains from trade, both, for the case of non-transferable and transferable utility, and what can be learned from reputation deals. Furthermore, a signaling model of teaming is developed that captures in a consistent way the process of information acquisition by the agents' strategic opponent, the market.Nova SBERUNLang, Günther2019-10-07T17:12:42Z2001-092001-09-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/83532engLang, Günther, Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams (September, 2001). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 404info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:37:17Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/83532Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:21.223817Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
title |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
spellingShingle |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams Lang, Günther Endogenous teams Reputation Signaling Adverse selection |
title_short |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
title_full |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
title_fullStr |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
title_sort |
Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams |
author |
Lang, Günther |
author_facet |
Lang, Günther |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lang, Günther |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Endogenous teams Reputation Signaling Adverse selection |
topic |
Endogenous teams Reputation Signaling Adverse selection |
description |
This paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a tradeoff between joining a high-productivity type but a low-reputation partner. It is examined whether there are gains from trade, both, for the case of non-transferable and transferable utility, and what can be learned from reputation deals. Furthermore, a signaling model of teaming is developed that captures in a consistent way the process of information acquisition by the agents' strategic opponent, the market. |
publishDate |
2001 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2001-09 2001-09-01T00:00:00Z 2019-10-07T17:12:42Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83532 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83532 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Lang, Günther, Reputation Deals: a Theory of Endogenous Teams (September, 2001). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 404 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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