Dúvida e processo penal: procedimento do tribunal do júri, decisão de pronúncia e o “in dubio pro societate"

• Autor(a) principal: Santiago, Nestor Eduardo Araruna
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Outros Autores: Braga, Italo Farias, Mamede, Juliana Maria Borges, Franco, Bianca Maria Simão, Ximenes, Lyara Maria Peres
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.34632/catolicalawreview.2019.9125

Questions were raised about doubt in criminal proceedings, referring to the indictment decision in the jury court. Methodologically, these questions were based on bibliographical, analytical and critical study, comparing doctrine. The existence of a specific delimitation of the criminal process was identified, which brings it closer to a limiting element of state discretion than to a typical enforcer of material law. It was then defined that the very notion of interpreting is not something imprecise and surrounded by institutional, human and factual limits. Given this, there is a discussion as to how the criminal process deals with doubt, so that those who recognize the process as a search for certainty indicate the formation of the principle in dubio pro societate, while others indicate that the presumption of innocence implies an in dubio pro reo. In the jury procedure, this limitation becomes more important, since the need for a pronouncement decision implies a further guarantee against the follow-up of the process, which justifies imagining a legislative position focused on the view of the process as a limit. Moreover, the legal concept does not directly establish that doubt should serve the follow-up of proceedings, but only requires the formation of evidence, so that the logic of criminal proceedings seems to be inappropriate to the applicability of in dubio pro societate.