Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63776 |
Resumo: | Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma. |
id |
RCAP_8559217aac19365f268b116094f79e57 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/63776 |
network_acronym_str |
RCAP |
network_name_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository_id_str |
7160 |
spelling |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmasComputer SimulationHumansModels, StatisticalCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryGroup ProcessesModels, PsychologicalScience & TechnologyMany problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma.This research was supported by FEDER through POFC - COMPETE and by FCT-Portugal through fellowships SFRH/BD/77389/2011 and SFRH/BD/86465/2012, by grants PTDC/MAT/122897/2010 and EXPL/EEI-SII/2556/2013, by multi-annual funding of CMAF-UL, CBMA-UM and INESC-ID (under the projects PEst-OE/MAT/UI0209/2013, PEst-OE/BIA/UI4050/2014 and PEst-OE/EEI/LA0021/2013) provided by FCT-Portugal, and by Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian through the "Stimulus to Research" program for young researchers. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.Public Library of Science (PLOS)Universidade do MinhoPinheiro, Flávio L.Vasconcelos, Vítor V.Santos, Francisco C.Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos2014-112014-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/63776engPinheiro FL, Vasconcelos VV, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2014) Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas. PLoS Comput Biol 10(11): e1003945. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.10039451553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.100394525393661https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:21:13Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/63776Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:14:25.654931Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
title |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
spellingShingle |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas Pinheiro, Flávio L. Computer Simulation Humans Models, Statistical Cooperative Behavior Game Theory Group Processes Models, Psychological Science & Technology |
title_short |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
title_full |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
title_fullStr |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
title_full_unstemmed |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
title_sort |
Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas |
author |
Pinheiro, Flávio L. |
author_facet |
Pinheiro, Flávio L. Vasconcelos, Vítor V. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Vasconcelos, Vítor V. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pinheiro, Flávio L. Vasconcelos, Vítor V. Santos, Francisco C. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Computer Simulation Humans Models, Statistical Cooperative Behavior Game Theory Group Processes Models, Psychological Science & Technology |
topic |
Computer Simulation Humans Models, Statistical Cooperative Behavior Game Theory Group Processes Models, Psychological Science & Technology |
description |
Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-11 2014-11-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63776 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/63776 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Pinheiro FL, Vasconcelos VV, Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2014) Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas. PLoS Comput Biol 10(11): e1003945. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945 1553-734X 1553-7358 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945 25393661 https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Public Library of Science (PLOS) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Public Library of Science (PLOS) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1799132586757324800 |