Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Costa, António
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Kokkinogenis, Zafeiris, D'Orey, Pedro, Rossetti, Rosaldo J. F.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/20889
Resumo: In Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, road users and traffic managers share information for coordinating their actions to improve traffic efficiency allowing the driver to adapt to the traffic situation. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the user’s decision-making process, which is the main source of uncertainty in any mobility system and depends on the ability of the infrastructure to communicate timely and reliably. To cope with such a complex scenario, this paper proposes a game theory perspective based on the n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor to represent the uncertainty of cooperation underlined by communication infrastructures in traveller information systems. Results highlighted a close relationship between the emergence of cooperation and network performance, as well as the impact of the communication failure on the loss of cooperation sustainment, which was not recovered after the system was re-established.
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spelling Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective220601Game Theoryn-Person Prisoner’s DilemmaAdvanced Traveller Information SystemCooperative Intelligent Transport SystemsAgent-based SimulationIn Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, road users and traffic managers share information for coordinating their actions to improve traffic efficiency allowing the driver to adapt to the traffic situation. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the user’s decision-making process, which is the main source of uncertainty in any mobility system and depends on the ability of the infrastructure to communicate timely and reliably. To cope with such a complex scenario, this paper proposes a game theory perspective based on the n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor to represent the uncertainty of cooperation underlined by communication infrastructures in traveller information systems. Results highlighted a close relationship between the emergence of cooperation and network performance, as well as the impact of the communication failure on the loss of cooperation sustainment, which was not recovered after the system was re-established.This work is a result of project DynamiCITY: Fostering Dynamic Adaptation of Smart Cities to Cope with Crises and Disruptions [reference NORTE-01-0145- FEDER-000073] supported by Norte Portugal Regional Operational Programme (NORTE 2020), under the PORTUGAL 2020 Partnership Agreement, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This work was also supported by national funds of FCT/MCTES (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology), within the CISTER Research Unit (UIDP/UIDB/04234/2020).Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do PortoCosta, AntónioKokkinogenis, ZafeirisD'Orey, PedroRossetti, Rosaldo J. F.2022-09-20T14:09:55Z2022-08-312022-08-31T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/20889enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-13T13:16:08Zoai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/20889Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:40:41.164009Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
220601
title Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
spellingShingle Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
Costa, António
Game Theory
n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
Advanced Traveller Information System
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems
Agent-based Simulation
title_short Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
title_full Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
title_fullStr Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
title_full_unstemmed Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
title_sort Assessing Communication Strategies in C-ITS using n-Person Prisoner 19s Dilemma Perspective
author Costa, António
author_facet Costa, António
Kokkinogenis, Zafeiris
D'Orey, Pedro
Rossetti, Rosaldo J. F.
author_role author
author2 Kokkinogenis, Zafeiris
D'Orey, Pedro
Rossetti, Rosaldo J. F.
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico do Instituto Politécnico do Porto
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Costa, António
Kokkinogenis, Zafeiris
D'Orey, Pedro
Rossetti, Rosaldo J. F.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Game Theory
n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
Advanced Traveller Information System
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems
Agent-based Simulation
topic Game Theory
n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
Advanced Traveller Information System
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems
Agent-based Simulation
description In Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, road users and traffic managers share information for coordinating their actions to improve traffic efficiency allowing the driver to adapt to the traffic situation. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the user’s decision-making process, which is the main source of uncertainty in any mobility system and depends on the ability of the infrastructure to communicate timely and reliably. To cope with such a complex scenario, this paper proposes a game theory perspective based on the n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor to represent the uncertainty of cooperation underlined by communication infrastructures in traveller information systems. Results highlighted a close relationship between the emergence of cooperation and network performance, as well as the impact of the communication failure on the loss of cooperation sustainment, which was not recovered after the system was re-established.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-09-20T14:09:55Z
2022-08-31
2022-08-31T00:00:00Z
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/20889
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/20889
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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