A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82982 |
Resumo: | We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the purification theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem. |
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A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large GamesBayesian gamesNash equilibriumPure strategiesWe present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the purification theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem.Nova SBERUNCarmona, Guilherme2019-10-02T15:36:56Z2006-07-112006-07-11T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82982engCarmona, Guilherme, A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games (July, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 491info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:36:55Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/82982Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:15.748276Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
title |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
spellingShingle |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games Carmona, Guilherme Bayesian games Nash equilibrium Pure strategies |
title_short |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
title_full |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
title_fullStr |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
title_sort |
A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games |
author |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_facet |
Carmona, Guilherme |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Bayesian games Nash equilibrium Pure strategies |
topic |
Bayesian games Nash equilibrium Pure strategies |
description |
We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the purification theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-07-11 2006-07-11T00:00:00Z 2019-10-02T15:36:56Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82982 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82982 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Carmona, Guilherme, A Unified Approach to the Purification of Nash Equilibria in Large Games (July, 2006). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 491 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799137981806673920 |