Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658 |
Resumo: | In programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness. |
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Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertisingEvidence from a randomized field experimentprogrammatic advertisingeconomics of advertisingfield experimentincentive misalignmentIn programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness.NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)RUNFrick, ThomasBelo, RodrigoTelang, Rahul2023-11-07T22:06:59Z2023-03-012023-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658eng0025-1909PURE: 36555341https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4438info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T05:42:05Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/159658Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:57:38.182974Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising Evidence from a randomized field experiment |
title |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
spellingShingle |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising Frick, Thomas programmatic advertising economics of advertising field experiment incentive misalignment |
title_short |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
title_full |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
title_fullStr |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
title_sort |
Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising |
author |
Frick, Thomas |
author_facet |
Frick, Thomas Belo, Rodrigo Telang, Rahul |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Belo, Rodrigo Telang, Rahul |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE) RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Frick, Thomas Belo, Rodrigo Telang, Rahul |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
programmatic advertising economics of advertising field experiment incentive misalignment |
topic |
programmatic advertising economics of advertising field experiment incentive misalignment |
description |
In programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-11-07T22:06:59Z 2023-03-01 2023-03-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0025-1909 PURE: 36555341 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4438 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
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reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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