Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Frick, Thomas
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Belo, Rodrigo, Telang, Rahul
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658
Resumo: In programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness.
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spelling Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertisingEvidence from a randomized field experimentprogrammatic advertisingeconomics of advertisingfield experimentincentive misalignmentIn programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness.NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)RUNFrick, ThomasBelo, RodrigoTelang, Rahul2023-11-07T22:06:59Z2023-03-012023-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658eng0025-1909PURE: 36555341https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4438info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T05:42:05Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/159658Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:57:38.182974Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
Evidence from a randomized field experiment
title Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
spellingShingle Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
Frick, Thomas
programmatic advertising
economics of advertising
field experiment
incentive misalignment
title_short Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
title_full Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
title_fullStr Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
title_full_unstemmed Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
title_sort Incentive misalignments in programmatic advertising
author Frick, Thomas
author_facet Frick, Thomas
Belo, Rodrigo
Telang, Rahul
author_role author
author2 Belo, Rodrigo
Telang, Rahul
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Frick, Thomas
Belo, Rodrigo
Telang, Rahul
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv programmatic advertising
economics of advertising
field experiment
incentive misalignment
topic programmatic advertising
economics of advertising
field experiment
incentive misalignment
description In programmatic advertising, firms outsource the bidding for ad impressions to ad platforms. Although firms are interested in targeting consumers that respond positively to advertising, ad platforms are usually rewarded for targeting consumers with high overall purchase probability. We develop a theoretical model that shows if consumers with high baseline purchase probability respond more positively to advertising, then firms and ad platforms agree on which consumers to target. If, conversely, consumers with low baseline purchase probability are the ones for which ads work best, then ad platforms target consumers that firms do not want to target—the incentives are misaligned. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment, targeting 208,538 individual consumers, in a display retargeting campaign. Our unique data set allows us to both causally identify advertising effectiveness and estimate the degree of incentive misalignments between the firm and ad platform. In accordance with the contracted incentives, the ad platform targets consumers that are more likely to purchase. Importantly, we find no evidence that ads are more effective for consumers with higher baseline purchase probability, rendering the ad platform’s bidding suboptimal for the firm. A welfare analysis suggests that the ad platform’s bidding optimization leads to a loss in profit for the firm and an overall decline in welfare. To remedy the incentive misalignment, we propose a solution in which the firm restricts the ad platform to target only consumers that are profitable based on individual consumer-level estimates for baseline purchase probability and ad effectiveness.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-11-07T22:06:59Z
2023-03-01
2023-03-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/159658
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0025-1909
PURE: 36555341
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4438
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