How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Fonseca, Miguel A.
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Gonçalves, Ricardo, Pinho, Joana, Tabacco, Giovanni A.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39392
Resumo: We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers’ labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholders for a given legal regime, as well as the probability of managers forming explicit cartels and coordinating on prices in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly, taking contract and legal regime as given. Our results suggest that there is less collusion when the legal regime prosecutes managers. High-powered contracts do not incentivize cartel formation or price coordination effectively, irrespective of legal regime. Nevertheless, high-powered contracts were most frequently chosen by shareholders, often with collusive intents.
id RCAP_94b4eb6939fcf22381dde6f5275b5653
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/39392
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experimentAntitrustCartel formationExperimentManagerial compensationWe explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers’ labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholders for a given legal regime, as well as the probability of managers forming explicit cartels and coordinating on prices in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly, taking contract and legal regime as given. Our results suggest that there is less collusion when the legal regime prosecutes managers. High-powered contracts do not incentivize cartel formation or price coordination effectively, irrespective of legal regime. Nevertheless, high-powered contracts were most frequently chosen by shareholders, often with collusive intents.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaFonseca, Miguel A.Gonçalves, RicardoPinho, JoanaTabacco, Giovanni A.2022-11-24T15:08:31Z2022-122022-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39392eng0167-268110.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.03185141764192000886757000014info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-09T01:36:27Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/39392Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:32:14.510937Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
title How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
spellingShingle How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
Fonseca, Miguel A.
Antitrust
Cartel formation
Experiment
Managerial compensation
title_short How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
title_full How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
title_fullStr How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
title_full_unstemmed How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
title_sort How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
author Fonseca, Miguel A.
author_facet Fonseca, Miguel A.
Gonçalves, Ricardo
Pinho, Joana
Tabacco, Giovanni A.
author_role author
author2 Gonçalves, Ricardo
Pinho, Joana
Tabacco, Giovanni A.
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Fonseca, Miguel A.
Gonçalves, Ricardo
Pinho, Joana
Tabacco, Giovanni A.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Antitrust
Cartel formation
Experiment
Managerial compensation
topic Antitrust
Cartel formation
Experiment
Managerial compensation
description We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers’ labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholders for a given legal regime, as well as the probability of managers forming explicit cartels and coordinating on prices in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly, taking contract and legal regime as given. Our results suggest that there is less collusion when the legal regime prosecutes managers. High-powered contracts do not incentivize cartel formation or price coordination effectively, irrespective of legal regime. Nevertheless, high-powered contracts were most frequently chosen by shareholders, often with collusive intents.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-11-24T15:08:31Z
2022-12
2022-12-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39392
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39392
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0167-2681
10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.031
85141764192
000886757000014
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799132046363197440

Registros relacionados