Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25180 |
Resumo: | n some markets, consumers do not know the attributes of all the products that are available in the market, or the prices at which they are offered. To overcome this uncertainty, consumers may gather and process information about those attributes and prices. In this paper, we examine the consequences of consumer costs of doing so on firms product attribute and pricing decisions. To do so, we follow the rational inattention literature in assuming that, before entering the choice situation, consumers are in contact with all products, but may have an incomplete or imprecise prior idea about their attributes and prices. Further, we also assume that consumers can, at a cost, gather and process information in a non-random fashion about any (sub)set of products, with any precision about their attributes and prices. Furthermore, we assume that products are characterized by both horizontal and vertically differentiated attributes, which we address as design and quality, respectively. We find a number of interesting results. First, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are homogeneous among consumers, firm' should differentiate their products as those costs fall, so to relax the otherwise increasing price competition. This implies that equilibrium prices may increase as these costs decrease, because product differentiation countervails the otherwise negative impact on prices. Second, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are heterogeneous among consumers, with a sizeable proportion of "informed" consumers, firms should always seek to differentiate their products as maximum as possible, independently of the level of information costs of the "uninformed" consumers. This implies that equilibrium price levels do not increase (and, in fact, tend to decrease) as the unit costs of those consumers decrease and that "informed" consumers serve as a "market competition guardian". Finally, in all the above cases, firms do not need to differentiate themselves along all attribute dimensions. Differentiation along one attribute dimension is more than enough to relax price competition. |
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Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumersRational InattentionInformation FrictionsProduct DifferentiationPricingn some markets, consumers do not know the attributes of all the products that are available in the market, or the prices at which they are offered. To overcome this uncertainty, consumers may gather and process information about those attributes and prices. In this paper, we examine the consequences of consumer costs of doing so on firms product attribute and pricing decisions. To do so, we follow the rational inattention literature in assuming that, before entering the choice situation, consumers are in contact with all products, but may have an incomplete or imprecise prior idea about their attributes and prices. Further, we also assume that consumers can, at a cost, gather and process information in a non-random fashion about any (sub)set of products, with any precision about their attributes and prices. Furthermore, we assume that products are characterized by both horizontal and vertically differentiated attributes, which we address as design and quality, respectively. We find a number of interesting results. First, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are homogeneous among consumers, firm' should differentiate their products as those costs fall, so to relax the otherwise increasing price competition. This implies that equilibrium prices may increase as these costs decrease, because product differentiation countervails the otherwise negative impact on prices. Second, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are heterogeneous among consumers, with a sizeable proportion of "informed" consumers, firms should always seek to differentiate their products as maximum as possible, independently of the level of information costs of the "uninformed" consumers. This implies that equilibrium price levels do not increase (and, in fact, tend to decrease) as the unit costs of those consumers decrease and that "informed" consumers serve as a "market competition guardian". Finally, in all the above cases, firms do not need to differentiate themselves along all attribute dimensions. Differentiation along one attribute dimension is more than enough to relax price competition.Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaCunha, MarianaOsório, AntónioRibeiro, Ricardo2018-07-05T16:19:44Z20162016-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25180engCunha, M., Osório, A., Ribeiro, R. (2016). Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers. Working papers: Economics. N.º 3, 58 p.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-12T17:30:34Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/25180Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:20:04.916023Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
title |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
spellingShingle |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers Cunha, Mariana Rational Inattention Information Frictions Product Differentiation Pricing |
title_short |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
title_full |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
title_fullStr |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
title_full_unstemmed |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
title_sort |
Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers |
author |
Cunha, Mariana |
author_facet |
Cunha, Mariana Osório, António Ribeiro, Ricardo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Osório, António Ribeiro, Ricardo |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cunha, Mariana Osório, António Ribeiro, Ricardo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Rational Inattention Information Frictions Product Differentiation Pricing |
topic |
Rational Inattention Information Frictions Product Differentiation Pricing |
description |
n some markets, consumers do not know the attributes of all the products that are available in the market, or the prices at which they are offered. To overcome this uncertainty, consumers may gather and process information about those attributes and prices. In this paper, we examine the consequences of consumer costs of doing so on firms product attribute and pricing decisions. To do so, we follow the rational inattention literature in assuming that, before entering the choice situation, consumers are in contact with all products, but may have an incomplete or imprecise prior idea about their attributes and prices. Further, we also assume that consumers can, at a cost, gather and process information in a non-random fashion about any (sub)set of products, with any precision about their attributes and prices. Furthermore, we assume that products are characterized by both horizontal and vertically differentiated attributes, which we address as design and quality, respectively. We find a number of interesting results. First, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are homogeneous among consumers, firm' should differentiate their products as those costs fall, so to relax the otherwise increasing price competition. This implies that equilibrium prices may increase as these costs decrease, because product differentiation countervails the otherwise negative impact on prices. Second, if the unit costs of gathering and processing information are heterogeneous among consumers, with a sizeable proportion of "informed" consumers, firms should always seek to differentiate their products as maximum as possible, independently of the level of information costs of the "uninformed" consumers. This implies that equilibrium price levels do not increase (and, in fact, tend to decrease) as the unit costs of those consumers decrease and that "informed" consumers serve as a "market competition guardian". Finally, in all the above cases, firms do not need to differentiate themselves along all attribute dimensions. Differentiation along one attribute dimension is more than enough to relax price competition. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z 2018-07-05T16:19:44Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25180 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25180 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Cunha, M., Osório, A., Ribeiro, R. (2016). Endogenous product design and quality with rationally inattentive consumers. Working papers: Economics. N.º 3, 58 p. |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799131897776832512 |