Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38229 |
Resumo: | This paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players. |
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Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES formTwo-person cooperative gamesCooperative games maximandsOpportunismPessimismThis paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players.Turkish Economic ReviewVeritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica PortuguesaMartins, Ana Paula2022-07-15T14:33:14Z20212021-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38229eng2149-041410.1453/ter.v8i4.2275info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-12T17:43:43Zoai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/38229Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:31:09.822550Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
title |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
spellingShingle |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form Martins, Ana Paula Two-person cooperative games Cooperative games maximands Opportunism Pessimism |
title_short |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
title_full |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
title_fullStr |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
title_full_unstemmed |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
title_sort |
Reconciling the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky cooperative solutions: generalized maximands of CES form |
author |
Martins, Ana Paula |
author_facet |
Martins, Ana Paula |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Martins, Ana Paula |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Two-person cooperative games Cooperative games maximands Opportunism Pessimism |
topic |
Two-person cooperative games Cooperative games maximands Opportunism Pessimism |
description |
This paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z 2022-07-15T14:33:14Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38229 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38229 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2149-0414 10.1453/ter.v8i4.2275 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Turkish Economic Review |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Turkish Economic Review |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799132035207397376 |