Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Dionisio, F.
Data de Publicação: 2007
Outros Autores: Gordo, I.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85
Resumo: Background: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization - that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates.
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spelling Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperationEvolution of complexityExcludabilityMulti-level selectionPrivatizationRivalryTragedy of the commonsKin selection modelCollective actionMultilevel selectionSocial evolutionCommonsTragedyTransitionsCompetitionRepressionBackground: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization - that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates.ARCADionisio, F.Gordo, I.2010-03-25T13:08:58Z20072007-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85engDionisio, F. and I. Gordo (2007) Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Ecology Research 9(2): 365-373info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2022-11-29T14:34:38Zoai:arca.igc.gulbenkian.pt:10400.7/85Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:11:34.273137Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
title Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
spellingShingle Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
Dionisio, F.
Evolution of complexity
Excludability
Multi-level selection
Privatization
Rivalry
Tragedy of the commons
Kin selection model
Collective action
Multilevel selection
Social evolution
Commons
Tragedy
Transitions
Competition
Repression
title_short Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
title_full Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
title_fullStr Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
title_sort Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
author Dionisio, F.
author_facet Dionisio, F.
Gordo, I.
author_role author
author2 Gordo, I.
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv ARCA
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Dionisio, F.
Gordo, I.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Evolution of complexity
Excludability
Multi-level selection
Privatization
Rivalry
Tragedy of the commons
Kin selection model
Collective action
Multilevel selection
Social evolution
Commons
Tragedy
Transitions
Competition
Repression
topic Evolution of complexity
Excludability
Multi-level selection
Privatization
Rivalry
Tragedy of the commons
Kin selection model
Collective action
Multilevel selection
Social evolution
Commons
Tragedy
Transitions
Competition
Repression
description Background: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization - that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007
2007-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-03-25T13:08:58Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/85
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Dionisio, F. and I. Gordo (2007) Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Ecology Research 9(2): 365-373
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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