The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Dionisio, F.
Data de Publicação: 2006
Outros Autores: Gordo, I.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/88
Resumo: Problem: In the study of conflicts, both economists and evolutionary biologists use the concepts ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘public goods dilemma’. What is the relationship between the economist and evolutionist views of these concepts? Model features: The economics literature defines the tragedy of the commons and the public goods dilemma in terms of rivalry and excludability of the good. In contrast, evolutionists define these conflicts based on fitness functions with two components: individual and group components of fitness. Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory and the calculation of evolutionarily stable strategy trait values by standard optimization techniques and by replacing slopes of group phenotype on individual genotype by coefficients of relatedness. Conclusion: There is a direct relationship between rivalry and the individual component of fitness and between excludability and the group component of fitness. Moreover, although the prisoner’s dilemma constitutes a suitable metaphor to analyse both the public goods dilemma and the tragedy of the commons, it gives the false idea that the two conflicts are symmetric since they refer to situations in which individuals consume a common resource – tragedy of the commons – or contribute to a collective action or common good – public goods dilemma. However, the two situations are clearly not symmetric: from the economical point of view they differ by rivalry, and from the evolutionary biology point of view the two conflicts differ by the significance of the within-group competition in the fitness function.
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spelling The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biologycollective actionexcludabilityprisoner's dilemmapublic goods dilemmarivalrytragedy of the commonsPathogenic BacteriaCooperationKin Selection ModelPrisoner’s dilemmaPublic goods dilemmaTragedy of the commonsProblem: In the study of conflicts, both economists and evolutionary biologists use the concepts ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘public goods dilemma’. What is the relationship between the economist and evolutionist views of these concepts? Model features: The economics literature defines the tragedy of the commons and the public goods dilemma in terms of rivalry and excludability of the good. In contrast, evolutionists define these conflicts based on fitness functions with two components: individual and group components of fitness. Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory and the calculation of evolutionarily stable strategy trait values by standard optimization techniques and by replacing slopes of group phenotype on individual genotype by coefficients of relatedness. Conclusion: There is a direct relationship between rivalry and the individual component of fitness and between excludability and the group component of fitness. Moreover, although the prisoner’s dilemma constitutes a suitable metaphor to analyse both the public goods dilemma and the tragedy of the commons, it gives the false idea that the two conflicts are symmetric since they refer to situations in which individuals consume a common resource – tragedy of the commons – or contribute to a collective action or common good – public goods dilemma. However, the two situations are clearly not symmetric: from the economical point of view they differ by rivalry, and from the evolutionary biology point of view the two conflicts differ by the significance of the within-group competition in the fitness function.Evolutionary EcologyARCADionisio, F.Gordo, I.2010-03-25T14:21:50Z20062006-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/88engDionisio, F., Gordo, I. (2006) The Tragedy of the Commons, the Public Goods Dilemma, and the meaning of Rivalry and Excludability in Evolutionary Biology. Evolutionary Ecology Research 8: 321-3320269-7653info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2022-11-29T14:34:38Zoai:arca.igc.gulbenkian.pt:10400.7/88Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:11:34.374899Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
title The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
spellingShingle The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
Dionisio, F.
collective action
excludability
prisoner's dilemma
public goods dilemma
rivalry
tragedy of the commons
Pathogenic Bacteria
Cooperation
Kin Selection Model
Prisoner’s dilemma
Public goods dilemma
Tragedy of the commons
title_short The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
title_full The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
title_fullStr The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
title_full_unstemmed The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
title_sort The tragedy of the commons, the public goods dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology
author Dionisio, F.
author_facet Dionisio, F.
Gordo, I.
author_role author
author2 Gordo, I.
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv ARCA
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Dionisio, F.
Gordo, I.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv collective action
excludability
prisoner's dilemma
public goods dilemma
rivalry
tragedy of the commons
Pathogenic Bacteria
Cooperation
Kin Selection Model
Prisoner’s dilemma
Public goods dilemma
Tragedy of the commons
topic collective action
excludability
prisoner's dilemma
public goods dilemma
rivalry
tragedy of the commons
Pathogenic Bacteria
Cooperation
Kin Selection Model
Prisoner’s dilemma
Public goods dilemma
Tragedy of the commons
description Problem: In the study of conflicts, both economists and evolutionary biologists use the concepts ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘public goods dilemma’. What is the relationship between the economist and evolutionist views of these concepts? Model features: The economics literature defines the tragedy of the commons and the public goods dilemma in terms of rivalry and excludability of the good. In contrast, evolutionists define these conflicts based on fitness functions with two components: individual and group components of fitness. Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory and the calculation of evolutionarily stable strategy trait values by standard optimization techniques and by replacing slopes of group phenotype on individual genotype by coefficients of relatedness. Conclusion: There is a direct relationship between rivalry and the individual component of fitness and between excludability and the group component of fitness. Moreover, although the prisoner’s dilemma constitutes a suitable metaphor to analyse both the public goods dilemma and the tragedy of the commons, it gives the false idea that the two conflicts are symmetric since they refer to situations in which individuals consume a common resource – tragedy of the commons – or contribute to a collective action or common good – public goods dilemma. However, the two situations are clearly not symmetric: from the economical point of view they differ by rivalry, and from the evolutionary biology point of view the two conflicts differ by the significance of the within-group competition in the fitness function.
publishDate 2006
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2006
2006-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-03-25T14:21:50Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/88
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.7/88
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Dionisio, F., Gordo, I. (2006) The Tragedy of the Commons, the Public Goods Dilemma, and the meaning of Rivalry and Excludability in Evolutionary Biology. Evolutionary Ecology Research 8: 321-332
0269-7653
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Evolutionary Ecology
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Evolutionary Ecology
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