Buying the Option to say "No"

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lang, Günther
Data de Publicação: 2000
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83628
Resumo: We analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no" by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining process begins. This choice is observable to the buyer, and hence, the seller's pre-bargaining action might signal private information. We develop a complete characterization of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure and (strictly) mixed strategies for this game. Then the model is compared to a standard bargaining setting in terms of the realization of welfare enhancing property-right changes.
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spelling Buying the Option to say "No"BargainingSignallingWe analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no" by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining process begins. This choice is observable to the buyer, and hence, the seller's pre-bargaining action might signal private information. We develop a complete characterization of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure and (strictly) mixed strategies for this game. Then the model is compared to a standard bargaining setting in terms of the realization of welfare enhancing property-right changes.Nova SBERUNLang, Günther2019-10-08T08:56:45Z2000-122000-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/83628engLang, Günther, Buying the Option to say "No" (December, 2000). FEUNL Working Paper Series No.397info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:37:18Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/83628Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:21.719634Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Buying the Option to say "No"
title Buying the Option to say "No"
spellingShingle Buying the Option to say "No"
Lang, Günther
Bargaining
Signalling
title_short Buying the Option to say "No"
title_full Buying the Option to say "No"
title_fullStr Buying the Option to say "No"
title_full_unstemmed Buying the Option to say "No"
title_sort Buying the Option to say "No"
author Lang, Günther
author_facet Lang, Günther
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lang, Günther
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Bargaining
Signalling
topic Bargaining
Signalling
description We analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no" by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining process begins. This choice is observable to the buyer, and hence, the seller's pre-bargaining action might signal private information. We develop a complete characterization of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure and (strictly) mixed strategies for this game. Then the model is compared to a standard bargaining setting in terms of the realization of welfare enhancing property-right changes.
publishDate 2000
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2000-12
2000-12-01T00:00:00Z
2019-10-08T08:56:45Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83628
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83628
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Lang, Günther, Buying the Option to say "No" (December, 2000). FEUNL Working Paper Series No.397
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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