Let the games begin and go on

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Matos, M. C. P.
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Ferreira, M. A. M., Filipe, J. A.
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/14767
Resumo: Real life is a bigger game in which what a player does early on can affect what others choose to do later on. In particular we can strive to explain how cooperative behaviour can be established as a result of rational behaviour. When engaged in a repeated situation, players must consider not only their short-term gains but also their long-term payoffs. The general idea of repeated games is that players may be able to deter another player from exploiting his short-term advantage by threatening a punishment that reduces his long-term payoff. The aim of the paper that supports this abstract is to present and discuss dynamic game theory. There are three basic kinds of reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, to study what happens in repeated games. First, it provides a pleasant and a very interesting theory and it has the advantage of making us become more humble in our predictions. Second, many of the most interesting economic interactions repeated often can incorporate phenomena which we believe are important but which are not captured when we restrict our attention to static games. Finally, economics, and equilibrium based theories more generally, do best when analysing routinized interactions.
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spelling Let the games begin and go onDynamic gamesCode form gameRepeated gameReal life is a bigger game in which what a player does early on can affect what others choose to do later on. In particular we can strive to explain how cooperative behaviour can be established as a result of rational behaviour. When engaged in a repeated situation, players must consider not only their short-term gains but also their long-term payoffs. The general idea of repeated games is that players may be able to deter another player from exploiting his short-term advantage by threatening a punishment that reduces his long-term payoff. The aim of the paper that supports this abstract is to present and discuss dynamic game theory. There are three basic kinds of reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, to study what happens in repeated games. First, it provides a pleasant and a very interesting theory and it has the advantage of making us become more humble in our predictions. Second, many of the most interesting economic interactions repeated often can incorporate phenomena which we believe are important but which are not captured when we restrict our attention to static games. Finally, economics, and equilibrium based theories more generally, do best when analysing routinized interactions.Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.2017-12-14T14:27:31Z2018-01-01T00:00:00Z20182019-03-20T10:31:32Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/14767eng1751-200X10.1504/IJBSR.2018.10009017Matos, M. C. P.Ferreira, M. A. M.Filipe, J. A.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:38:59Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/14767Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:17:53.691457Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Let the games begin and go on
title Let the games begin and go on
spellingShingle Let the games begin and go on
Matos, M. C. P.
Dynamic games
Code form game
Repeated game
title_short Let the games begin and go on
title_full Let the games begin and go on
title_fullStr Let the games begin and go on
title_full_unstemmed Let the games begin and go on
title_sort Let the games begin and go on
author Matos, M. C. P.
author_facet Matos, M. C. P.
Ferreira, M. A. M.
Filipe, J. A.
author_role author
author2 Ferreira, M. A. M.
Filipe, J. A.
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Matos, M. C. P.
Ferreira, M. A. M.
Filipe, J. A.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Dynamic games
Code form game
Repeated game
topic Dynamic games
Code form game
Repeated game
description Real life is a bigger game in which what a player does early on can affect what others choose to do later on. In particular we can strive to explain how cooperative behaviour can be established as a result of rational behaviour. When engaged in a repeated situation, players must consider not only their short-term gains but also their long-term payoffs. The general idea of repeated games is that players may be able to deter another player from exploiting his short-term advantage by threatening a punishment that reduces his long-term payoff. The aim of the paper that supports this abstract is to present and discuss dynamic game theory. There are three basic kinds of reasons, which are not mutually exclusive, to study what happens in repeated games. First, it provides a pleasant and a very interesting theory and it has the advantage of making us become more humble in our predictions. Second, many of the most interesting economic interactions repeated often can incorporate phenomena which we believe are important but which are not captured when we restrict our attention to static games. Finally, economics, and equilibrium based theories more generally, do best when analysing routinized interactions.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-14T14:27:31Z
2018-01-01T00:00:00Z
2018
2019-03-20T10:31:32Z
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10071/14767
url http://hdl.handle.net/10071/14767
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 1751-200X
10.1504/IJBSR.2018.10009017
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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