Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738 |
Resumo: | Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics. |
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Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcementCollusionAntitrustAlgorithmTuring MachineChurch-Turing ThesisRecursivenessUndecidabilityAlgorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics.CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa2021-01-12T12:08:05Z2021-06-01T00:00:00Z2021-06info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738eng2184-898Xhttps://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.01.4Gata, João E.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-11T02:26:33Zoai:repositorio.ual.pt:11144/4738Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:35:22.375420Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
title |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
spellingShingle |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement Gata, João E. Collusion Antitrust Algorithm Turing Machine Church-Turing Thesis Recursiveness Undecidability |
title_short |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
title_full |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
title_fullStr |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
title_full_unstemmed |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
title_sort |
Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement |
author |
Gata, João E. |
author_facet |
Gata, João E. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Gata, João E. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Collusion Antitrust Algorithm Turing Machine Church-Turing Thesis Recursiveness Undecidability |
topic |
Collusion Antitrust Algorithm Turing Machine Church-Turing Thesis Recursiveness Undecidability |
description |
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-01-12T12:08:05Z 2021-06-01T00:00:00Z 2021-06 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2184-898X https://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.01.4 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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