Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gata, João E.
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738
Resumo: Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics.
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spelling Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcementCollusionAntitrustAlgorithmTuring MachineChurch-Turing ThesisRecursivenessUndecidabilityAlgorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics.CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa2021-01-12T12:08:05Z2021-06-01T00:00:00Z2021-06info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738eng2184-898Xhttps://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.01.4Gata, João E.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-11T02:26:33Zoai:repositorio.ual.pt:11144/4738Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:35:22.375420Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
title Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
spellingShingle Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
Gata, João E.
Collusion
Antitrust
Algorithm
Turing Machine
Church-Turing Thesis
Recursiveness
Undecidability
title_short Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
title_full Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
title_fullStr Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
title_full_unstemmed Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
title_sort Collusion between Algorithms: a literature review and limits to enforcement
author Gata, João E.
author_facet Gata, João E.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gata, João E.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Collusion
Antitrust
Algorithm
Turing Machine
Church-Turing Thesis
Recursiveness
Undecidability
topic Collusion
Antitrust
Algorithm
Turing Machine
Church-Turing Thesis
Recursiveness
Undecidability
description Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic activity, as they become faster and smarter. Together with the increasing use of ever larger data sets, they may lead to significant changes in the way markets work. These developments have raised concerns not only over the right to privacy and consumers’ autonomy, but also on competition. Infringements of antitrust laws involving the use of algorithms have occurred in the past. However, current concerns are of a different nature as they relate to the role algorithms can play as facilitators of collusive behavior in repeated games, and the role increasingly sophisticated algorithms can play as autonomous implementers of firms’ strategies, as they learn to collude without any explicit instructions provided by human agents. In particular, it is recognized that the use of ‘learning algorithms’ can facilitate tacit collusion and lead to an increased blurring of borders between tacit and explicit collusion. Several authors who have addressed the possibilities for achieving tacit collusion equilibrium outcomes by algorithms interacting autonomously, have also considered some form of ex-ante assessment and regulation over the type of algorithms used by firms. By using well-known results in the theory of computation, I show that such option faces serious challenges to its effectiveness due to undecidability results. Ex-post assessment may be constrained as well. Notwithstanding several challenges faced by current software testing methodologies, competition law enforcement and policy have much to gain from an interdisciplinary collaboration with computer science and mathematics.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-12T12:08:05Z
2021-06-01T00:00:00Z
2021-06
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11144/4738
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 2184-898X
https://doi.org/10.26619/ERBE-2021.01.4
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
publisher.none.fl_str_mv CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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