Protection of natural and social resources. A political economy approach

• Autor(a) principal: Gatti, Donatella
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/21847
• topic: Institutions; political choice; redistribution; green legislation

This paper studies the set-up (following a voting process) of institutional arrangements related to the protection of natural and social resources in a context of inequalities and environmental challenges. To analyze how institutional and legislative protection arises, three socioeconomic groups are considered: the educated bourgeoisie, the working classes and the Önancial elite. Groups are di§erentiated according to the following divides. Individuals belonging to the Önancial elite only rely on capital incomes: they invest on Örms running either polluting or non-polluting activities. Individuals belonging to the Örst two groups are di§erentiated on the following levels: the demand for redistribution (from the working class) and the claims for environment-friendly legislation in relation with clean transport means (by the educated bourgeoisie). We study the institutional framework chosen by individuals under di§erent assumptions concerning the political vote: disjoint majority versus coalition voting. The main result is that -in reaction to the Önancial elite being the unique winner of the disjoint majority vote- a peopleís green coalition can emerge, whose redistributive and green choices run against the preferences of the Önancial elite. This leads to the "greening" of the Önancial elite, which in turn isolates the working classes in the political arena.