Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2019 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727 |
Resumo: | Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected. |
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Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessionsCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoSocial SciencesPolitical budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT)Western Economic Assoc IntUniversidade do MinhoBohn, FrankVeiga, Francisco José20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727engFrank Bohn,Francisco Veiga,Political Opportunism and Countercyclical FiscalPolicy in Election-Year Recessions, Economic Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 4, 2019, Pages 2058-2081. DOI: 10.1111/ecin.128130095-258310.1111/ecin.12813https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecin.12813info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:53:24Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/66727Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:52:45.800490Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
title |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
spellingShingle |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions Bohn, Frank Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences |
title_short |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
title_full |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
title_fullStr |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
title_full_unstemmed |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
title_sort |
Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions |
author |
Bohn, Frank |
author_facet |
Bohn, Frank Veiga, Francisco José |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Veiga, Francisco José |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bohn, Frank Veiga, Francisco José |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences |
topic |
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão Social Sciences |
description |
Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Frank Bohn,Francisco Veiga,Political Opportunism and Countercyclical FiscalPolicy in Election-Year Recessions, Economic Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 4, 2019, Pages 2058-2081. DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12813 0095-2583 10.1111/ecin.12813 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecin.12813 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Western Economic Assoc Int |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Western Economic Assoc Int |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799133121401061376 |