Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bohn, Frank
Data de Publicação: 2019
Outros Autores: Veiga, Francisco José
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727
Resumo: Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.
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spelling Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessionsCiências Sociais::Economia e GestãoSocial SciencesPolitical budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT)Western Economic Assoc IntUniversidade do MinhoBohn, FrankVeiga, Francisco José20192019-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727engFrank Bohn,Francisco Veiga,Political Opportunism and Countercyclical FiscalPolicy in Election-Year Recessions, Economic Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 4, 2019, Pages 2058-2081. DOI: 10.1111/ecin.128130095-258310.1111/ecin.12813https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecin.12813info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:53:24Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/66727Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:52:45.800490Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
title Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
spellingShingle Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
Bohn, Frank
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
title_short Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
title_full Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
title_fullStr Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
title_full_unstemmed Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
title_sort Political opportunism and countercyclical fiscal policy in election-year recessions
author Bohn, Frank
author_facet Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
author_role author
author2 Veiga, Francisco José
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bohn, Frank
Veiga, Francisco José
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
topic Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Social Sciences
description Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2019-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727
url http://hdl.handle.net/1822/66727
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Frank Bohn,Francisco Veiga,Political Opportunism and Countercyclical FiscalPolicy in Election-Year Recessions, Economic Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 4, 2019, Pages 2058-2081. DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12813
0095-2583
10.1111/ecin.12813
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecin.12813
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Western Economic Assoc Int
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Western Economic Assoc Int
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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