EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Jenkins, David
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.83
Resumo: John Roemer has created a model by which the luck egalitarian distinction between choice and luck can be used to motivate real policy decisions. By dividing society into ‘types’, Roemer suggests we are able to limit comparisons made between different people to that which they are able to control. In so doing, responsible individual action becomes the sole means by which inequalities can be justified and far more transformative redistributive legislation can be motivated. However, the model relies on two types of comparison – both within and between types – that ultimately flaw Roemer’s claims to be measuring responsible action. The model assumes that it is unproblematic to compare effort across individuals who are situated in radically unequal circumstances; it also assumes that the type can control for circumstances in a way that ignores the enormous contingency that constitutes human life. As a consequence, Roemer’s ambitious proposal fails to practically apply the choice-luck distinction
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spelling EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITYO ESFORÇO COMO RESPONSABILIDADEOriginal ArticlesJohn Roemer has created a model by which the luck egalitarian distinction between choice and luck can be used to motivate real policy decisions. By dividing society into ‘types’, Roemer suggests we are able to limit comparisons made between different people to that which they are able to control. In so doing, responsible individual action becomes the sole means by which inequalities can be justified and far more transformative redistributive legislation can be motivated. However, the model relies on two types of comparison – both within and between types – that ultimately flaw Roemer’s claims to be measuring responsible action. The model assumes that it is unproblematic to compare effort across individuals who are situated in radically unequal circumstances; it also assumes that the type can control for circumstances in a way that ignores the enormous contingency that constitutes human life. As a consequence, Roemer’s ambitious proposal fails to practically apply the choice-luck distinctionJohn Roemer criou um modelo através do qual a distinção que o igualitarismo da sorte estabelece entre escolha e sorte pode ser usada para motivar decisões reais acerca de políticas públicas. Através de uma divisão da sociedade em "tipos", Roemer sugere que é possível limitar as comparações entre diferentes pessoas àquilo que essas pessoas são capazes de controlar. Ao fazer isto, a acção individual responsável torna-se o único meio pelo qual as desigualdades podem ser justificadas e, simultaneamente, um meio de defender legislação redistributiva muito mais transformadora. No entanto, o modelo repousa sobre dois tipos de comparação - tanto dentro de cada tipo como entre tipos - que, em última instância, põem em causa a pretensão de Roemer de estar a medir a acção responsável. O modelo presume que não é problemático comparar o esforço entre indivíduos situados em circunstâncias radicalmente desiguais; e também presume que o tipo é capaz de verificar circunstâncias de uma forma que ignora a enorme contingência que constitui a vida humana. Em consequência disto, a ambiciosa proposta de Roemer não é capaz de aplicar na prática a distinção entre escolha e sorte.Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho2023-09-29info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.83eng2184-25822184-2574Jenkins, Davidinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-29T10:56:35Zoai:journals.uminho.pt:article/5276Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T01:58:41.931529Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
O ESFORÇO COMO RESPONSABILIDADE
title EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
spellingShingle EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
Jenkins, David
Original Articles
title_short EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
title_full EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
title_fullStr EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
title_full_unstemmed EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
title_sort EFFORT AS RESPONSIBILITY
author Jenkins, David
author_facet Jenkins, David
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Jenkins, David
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Original Articles
topic Original Articles
description John Roemer has created a model by which the luck egalitarian distinction between choice and luck can be used to motivate real policy decisions. By dividing society into ‘types’, Roemer suggests we are able to limit comparisons made between different people to that which they are able to control. In so doing, responsible individual action becomes the sole means by which inequalities can be justified and far more transformative redistributive legislation can be motivated. However, the model relies on two types of comparison – both within and between types – that ultimately flaw Roemer’s claims to be measuring responsible action. The model assumes that it is unproblematic to compare effort across individuals who are situated in radically unequal circumstances; it also assumes that the type can control for circumstances in a way that ignores the enormous contingency that constitutes human life. As a consequence, Roemer’s ambitious proposal fails to practically apply the choice-luck distinction
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-09-29
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.21814/eps.2.1.83
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centre for Ethics, Politics, and Society - ELACH, University of Minho
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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