Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Hasan, Abla
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24956
Resumo: Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.
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spelling Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance ConditionCauseEffectBackwards causationIgnorance conditionLogical consistencySince Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de FilosofiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaHasan, Abla2016-11-02T10:36:31Z2014-112014-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/24956eng0873-626Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T16:14:13Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/24956Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:42:00.621573Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
title Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
spellingShingle Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
Hasan, Abla
Cause
Effect
Backwards causation
Ignorance condition
Logical consistency
title_short Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
title_full Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
title_fullStr Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
title_full_unstemmed Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
title_sort Defending Backwards Causation against the Objection from the Ignorance Condition
author Hasan, Abla
author_facet Hasan, Abla
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Hasan, Abla
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Cause
Effect
Backwards causation
Ignorance condition
Logical consistency
topic Cause
Effect
Backwards causation
Ignorance condition
Logical consistency
description Since Michel Dummett published “Can an effect precede its cause?” (1954), in which he argued for the logical consistency of backwards causation, the controversial concept has turned to a subject of all kinds of interpretations and misinterpretations. Some like Ben-yami, Peijnenburg and Gorovitz have wrongly ascribed to Dummett the view that the argument for the consistency of believing in backwards causation applies only in cases where the agent doesn’t know about the occurrence of the past effect. In this paper I defend Dummett’s argument by clearing up the confusion caused by ascribing the ignorance condition to Dummett.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-11
2014-11-01T00:00:00Z
2016-11-02T10:36:31Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24956
url http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24956
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0873-626X
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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