Does Ontology Matter?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Graham, Andrew
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24936
Resumo: In this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular disputes do not. I apply this criterion in arguing that certain ontological disputes matter; specifically, the disputes over concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects. Finally, I consider how one could show that some ontological disputes do not matter, using a Platonism/nominalism dispute as an example.
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spelling Does Ontology Matter?OntologyMetaontologyPossible worldsCoincidencePlatonism and nominalismIn this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular disputes do not. I apply this criterion in arguing that certain ontological disputes matter; specifically, the disputes over concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects. Finally, I consider how one could show that some ontological disputes do not matter, using a Platonism/nominalism dispute as an example.Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de FilosofiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaGraham, Andrew2016-10-31T10:26:32Z2014-052014-05-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/24936eng0873-626Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T16:14:13Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/24936Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:42:00.962668Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Does Ontology Matter?
title Does Ontology Matter?
spellingShingle Does Ontology Matter?
Graham, Andrew
Ontology
Metaontology
Possible worlds
Coincidence
Platonism and nominalism
title_short Does Ontology Matter?
title_full Does Ontology Matter?
title_fullStr Does Ontology Matter?
title_full_unstemmed Does Ontology Matter?
title_sort Does Ontology Matter?
author Graham, Andrew
author_facet Graham, Andrew
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Graham, Andrew
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Ontology
Metaontology
Possible worlds
Coincidence
Platonism and nominalism
topic Ontology
Metaontology
Possible worlds
Coincidence
Platonism and nominalism
description In this paper, I argue that various disputes in ontology have important ramifications and so are worth taking seriously. I employ a criterion according to which whether a dispute matters depends on how integrated it is with the rest of our theoretical projects. Disputes that arise from previous tensions in our theorizing and have additional implications for other issues matter, while insular disputes do not. I apply this criterion in arguing that certain ontological disputes matter; specifically, the disputes over concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects. Finally, I consider how one could show that some ontological disputes do not matter, using a Platonism/nominalism dispute as an example.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-05
2014-05-01T00:00:00Z
2016-10-31T10:26:32Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24936
url http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24936
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0873-626X
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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