Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bignotto,Edson Costa
Data de Publicação: 2003
Outros Autores: Azevedo Filho,Adriano
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0103-20032003000100002
Resumo: This study characterizes the use of risk monitoring mechanisms by coffee and soybean trading and processing companies. It also investigates the role these mechanisms play in the mitigation of certain transaction costs associated to bounded rationality, information asymmetry, and business opportunism in negotiations involving derivatives. The results presented are based on literature and original research, which consisted of interviews with 19 coffee and soybean trading and processing company agents that deal with the management and execution of derivatives trades. The interviews suggest that the interest in formal risk monitoring mechanisms depends strongly on the organizational structure of the business. In family businesses, in which the owner participates actively in negotiations, the interest is limited. In non-family businesses, where there is a clear separation between supervisory upper-management and agents involved with trading, the interest in risk monitoring systems is more evident. This result seems to indicate that the mitigation of transaction costs associated with information asymmetry and opportunism might be stronger motivations for interest in risk monitoring mechanisms than the costs resulting from bounded rationality.
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spelling Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processorstransaction costfinancial riskcoffeesoybeansThis study characterizes the use of risk monitoring mechanisms by coffee and soybean trading and processing companies. It also investigates the role these mechanisms play in the mitigation of certain transaction costs associated to bounded rationality, information asymmetry, and business opportunism in negotiations involving derivatives. The results presented are based on literature and original research, which consisted of interviews with 19 coffee and soybean trading and processing company agents that deal with the management and execution of derivatives trades. The interviews suggest that the interest in formal risk monitoring mechanisms depends strongly on the organizational structure of the business. In family businesses, in which the owner participates actively in negotiations, the interest is limited. In non-family businesses, where there is a clear separation between supervisory upper-management and agents involved with trading, the interest in risk monitoring systems is more evident. This result seems to indicate that the mitigation of transaction costs associated with information asymmetry and opportunism might be stronger motivations for interest in risk monitoring mechanisms than the costs resulting from bounded rationality.Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural2003-03-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0103-20032003000100002Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural v.41 n.1 2003reponame:Revista de Economia e Sociologia Ruralinstname:Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural (SBESR)instacron:SBESR10.1590/S0103-20032003000100002info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBignotto,Edson CostaAzevedo Filho,Adrianoeng2003-07-15T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0103-20032003000100002Revistahttps://www.revistasober.org/ONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpsober@sober.org.br||resr@revistasober.org1806-94790103-2003opendoar:2003-07-15T00:00Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural - Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural (SBESR)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
title Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
spellingShingle Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
Bignotto,Edson Costa
transaction cost
financial risk
coffee
soybeans
title_short Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
title_full Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
title_fullStr Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
title_full_unstemmed Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
title_sort Financial risk monitoring and transaction costs in coffee & soybean trading companies and processors
author Bignotto,Edson Costa
author_facet Bignotto,Edson Costa
Azevedo Filho,Adriano
author_role author
author2 Azevedo Filho,Adriano
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bignotto,Edson Costa
Azevedo Filho,Adriano
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv transaction cost
financial risk
coffee
soybeans
topic transaction cost
financial risk
coffee
soybeans
description This study characterizes the use of risk monitoring mechanisms by coffee and soybean trading and processing companies. It also investigates the role these mechanisms play in the mitigation of certain transaction costs associated to bounded rationality, information asymmetry, and business opportunism in negotiations involving derivatives. The results presented are based on literature and original research, which consisted of interviews with 19 coffee and soybean trading and processing company agents that deal with the management and execution of derivatives trades. The interviews suggest that the interest in formal risk monitoring mechanisms depends strongly on the organizational structure of the business. In family businesses, in which the owner participates actively in negotiations, the interest is limited. In non-family businesses, where there is a clear separation between supervisory upper-management and agents involved with trading, the interest in risk monitoring systems is more evident. This result seems to indicate that the mitigation of transaction costs associated with information asymmetry and opportunism might be stronger motivations for interest in risk monitoring mechanisms than the costs resulting from bounded rationality.
publishDate 2003
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2003-03-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0103-20032003000100002
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0103-20032003000100002
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural v.41 n.1 2003
reponame:Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
instname:Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural (SBESR)
instacron:SBESR
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instacron_str SBESR
institution SBESR
reponame_str Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
collection Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural - Sociedade Brasileira de Economia e Sociologia Rural (SBESR)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv sober@sober.org.br||resr@revistasober.org
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