Abuse of dominance in the airport sector

• Autor(a) principal: Oliveira,Gustavo de Paula e
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Journal of Transport Literature
• Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2238-10312013000100002
• topic: airports; regulation; competition; law

This paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process.