Abuse of dominance in the airport sector
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Journal of Transport Literature |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2238-10312013000100002 |
Resumo: | This paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process. |
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Abuse of dominance in the airport sectorairportsregulationcompetitionlawThis paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process.Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes2013-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2238-10312013000100002Journal of Transport Literature v.7 n.1 2013reponame:Journal of Transport Literatureinstname:Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes (SBPT)instacron:SBPTR10.1590/S2238-10312013000100002info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessOliveira,Gustavo de Paula eeng2015-06-30T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S2238-10312013000100002Revistahttp://www.journal-of-transport-literature.org/https://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||alessandro.oliveira@pq.cnpq.br|| editor.jtl@gmail.com2238-10312238-1031opendoar:2015-06-30T00:00Journal of Transport Literature - Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes (SBPT)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
title |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
spellingShingle |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector Oliveira,Gustavo de Paula e airports regulation competition law |
title_short |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
title_full |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
title_fullStr |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
title_full_unstemmed |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
title_sort |
Abuse of dominance in the airport sector |
author |
Oliveira,Gustavo de Paula e |
author_facet |
Oliveira,Gustavo de Paula e |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Oliveira,Gustavo de Paula e |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
airports regulation competition law |
topic |
airports regulation competition law |
description |
This paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2238-10312013000100002 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2238-10312013000100002 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S2238-10312013000100002 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Transport Literature v.7 n.1 2013 reponame:Journal of Transport Literature instname:Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes (SBPT) instacron:SBPTR |
instname_str |
Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes (SBPT) |
instacron_str |
SBPTR |
institution |
SBPTR |
reponame_str |
Journal of Transport Literature |
collection |
Journal of Transport Literature |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Transport Literature - Sociedade Brasileira de Planejamento dos Transportes (SBPT) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||alessandro.oliveira@pq.cnpq.br|| editor.jtl@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1750318362240483328 |