The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Faria, Rodrigo Oliveira de
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: preprint
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: SciELO Preprints
Texto Completo: https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/4875
Resumo: The main objective of this article is to discuss the results and consequences of the broad budget reform process that took place in the last decade, which aimed to reduce the high levels of discretion of the Executive Branch and introduce equal treatment of parliamentarians, in relation to their amendments, prohibiting the political use for the release of funds. The results of the redesign of budgetary institutions signal, however, to the that the central purposes of the normative changes were not only not achieved, but reversed, from the broad control of the budget assumed by the National Congress, indicating emblematic limitations in the institutional reengineering. The consequences of the change in the budgetary constitutional order of 1988 were the significant reduction of the Executive's discretion, the increase of the National Congress' control in budgetary matters, the expansion of the discretion within the Legislative, the transfer of presidential prerogatives to the budget´s general-rapporteur and the explosion of general-rapporteur´s amendments, with the emblematic reversal of equal treatment, indicating relevant cracks in the budget reconfiguration. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the extensive documentation of the processing of annual budget bills and budget guidelines bills available on the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, as well as in the approved laws themselves (LOA and LDO). In addition, empirical data are used to support part of the conclusions reached in the study.
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spelling The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National CongressEl desmontaje de la caja de herramientas presupuestarias del Poder Ejecutivo y el control del presupuesto por parte del Congreso NacionalO desmonte da caixa de ferramentas orçamentárias do Poder Executivo e o controle do orçamento pelo Congresso Nacionalprocesso orçamentáriorelator-geraldiscricionariedadeemendas impositivaspresidencialismo de coalizãobudgetary processrapporteur-generaldiscretionparliamentary amendmentscoalition presidentialismproceso presupuestarioreportero generaldiscreciónenmiendas obligatoriaspresidencialismo de coaliciónThe main objective of this article is to discuss the results and consequences of the broad budget reform process that took place in the last decade, which aimed to reduce the high levels of discretion of the Executive Branch and introduce equal treatment of parliamentarians, in relation to their amendments, prohibiting the political use for the release of funds. The results of the redesign of budgetary institutions signal, however, to the that the central purposes of the normative changes were not only not achieved, but reversed, from the broad control of the budget assumed by the National Congress, indicating emblematic limitations in the institutional reengineering. The consequences of the change in the budgetary constitutional order of 1988 were the significant reduction of the Executive's discretion, the increase of the National Congress' control in budgetary matters, the expansion of the discretion within the Legislative, the transfer of presidential prerogatives to the budget´s general-rapporteur and the explosion of general-rapporteur´s amendments, with the emblematic reversal of equal treatment, indicating relevant cracks in the budget reconfiguration. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the extensive documentation of the processing of annual budget bills and budget guidelines bills available on the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, as well as in the approved laws themselves (LOA and LDO). In addition, empirical data are used to support part of the conclusions reached in the study.El objetivo principal de este artículo es discutir los resultados y consecuencias del amplio proceso de reforma presupuestaria que tuvo lugar en la última década, que tuvo como objetivo reducir los altos niveles de discrecionalidad del Poder Ejecutivo e introducir la igualdad de trato de los parlamentarios, en relación con sus enmiendas, prohibiendo la política de uso para la liberación de fondos. Los resultados del rediseño de las instituciones presupuestarias apuntan, sin embargo, a la señal de que los propósitos centrales de los cambios normativos no sólo no fueron alcanzados, sino revertidos, a partir del amplio control del presupuesto asumido por el Congreso Nacional, indicando limitaciones emblemáticas en la Proceso de reingeniería institucional. Las consecuencias del cambio en el ordenamiento constitucional presupuestario de 1988 fueron la reducción significativa de la discrecionalidad del Ejecutivo, el aumento del control del Congreso Nacional en materia presupuestaria, la ampliación de la discrecionalidad dentro del Legislativo, el traspaso de las prerrogativas presidenciales al Relatoría General de la presupuesto y la explosión de enmiendas por parte de la relatoría general “RP-9”, con la emblemática reversión de la igualdad de trato, indicando grietas relevantes en la reconfiguración presupuestaria. La metodología de investigación es cualitativa, basada en la extensa documentación de la tramitación de los proyectos de ley de presupuesto anual y de lineamientos presupuestarios disponible en los sitios web de la Cámara de Diputados y del Senado Federal. Además, se utilizan datos empíricos para sustentar parte de las conclusiones alcanzadas en el estúdio.Este artigo tem como objetivo central discutir os resultados e consequências do amplo processo de reforma orçamentária ocorrido na última década que pretendeu reduzir os elevados níveis de discricionariedade do Poder Executivo e introduzir o tratamento igualitário dos parlamentares, relativamente às suas emendas, vedando-se o uso político de liberação das verbas. Os resultados do redesenho das instituições orçamentárias apontam, contudo, para a sinalização de que as finalidades centrais das alterações normativas não somente não foram alcançadas, mas revertidas, a partir do amplo controle do orçamento assumido pelo Congresso Nacional, indicando limitações emblemáticas no processo de reengenharia institucional. As consequências da mudança da ordem constitucional orçamentária de 1988 foram a significativa redução da discricionariedade do Executivo, o aumento do controle do Congresso Nacional em matéria orçamentária, a ampliação da discricionariedade no âmbito do Legislativo, a transferência de prerrogativas presidenciais para o relator-geral do PLOA e a explosão das emendas de relator-geral RP-9, com a emblemática reversão do tratamento igualitário, a indicar fissuras relevantes na reconfiguração orçamentária. A metodologia de pesquisa é qualitativa, com supedâneo na extensa documentação de tramitação dos projetos de lei orçamentária anual e dos projetos de lei de diretrizes orçamentárias disponível nos sítios eletrônicos da Câmara dos Deputados e do Senado Federal, bem como nas próprias leis aprovadas (LOA e LDO). Utiliza-se, adicionalmente, de dados empíricos para fundamentação de parte das conclusões alcançadas no estudo.SciELO PreprintsSciELO PreprintsSciELO Preprints2022-11-04info:eu-repo/semantics/preprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/487510.1590/SciELOPreprints.4875porhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/4875/9458Copyright (c) 2022 Rodrigo Oliveira de Fariahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFaria, Rodrigo Oliveira dereponame:SciELO Preprintsinstname:SciELOinstacron:SCI2022-10-17T17:04:46Zoai:ops.preprints.scielo.org:preprint/4875Servidor de preprintshttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scieloONGhttps://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/oaiscielo.submission@scielo.orgopendoar:2022-10-17T17:04:46SciELO Preprints - SciELOfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
El desmontaje de la caja de herramientas presupuestarias del Poder Ejecutivo y el control del presupuesto por parte del Congreso Nacional
O desmonte da caixa de ferramentas orçamentárias do Poder Executivo e o controle do orçamento pelo Congresso Nacional
title The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
spellingShingle The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
Faria, Rodrigo Oliveira de
processo orçamentário
relator-geral
discricionariedade
emendas impositivas
presidencialismo de coalizão
budgetary process
rapporteur-general
discretion
parliamentary amendments
coalition presidentialism
proceso presupuestario
reportero general
discreción
enmiendas obligatorias
presidencialismo de coalición
title_short The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
title_full The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
title_fullStr The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
title_full_unstemmed The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
title_sort The dismantling of the executive branchs budget toolbox and the control of the budget by the National Congress
author Faria, Rodrigo Oliveira de
author_facet Faria, Rodrigo Oliveira de
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Faria, Rodrigo Oliveira de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv processo orçamentário
relator-geral
discricionariedade
emendas impositivas
presidencialismo de coalizão
budgetary process
rapporteur-general
discretion
parliamentary amendments
coalition presidentialism
proceso presupuestario
reportero general
discreción
enmiendas obligatorias
presidencialismo de coalición
topic processo orçamentário
relator-geral
discricionariedade
emendas impositivas
presidencialismo de coalizão
budgetary process
rapporteur-general
discretion
parliamentary amendments
coalition presidentialism
proceso presupuestario
reportero general
discreción
enmiendas obligatorias
presidencialismo de coalición
description The main objective of this article is to discuss the results and consequences of the broad budget reform process that took place in the last decade, which aimed to reduce the high levels of discretion of the Executive Branch and introduce equal treatment of parliamentarians, in relation to their amendments, prohibiting the political use for the release of funds. The results of the redesign of budgetary institutions signal, however, to the that the central purposes of the normative changes were not only not achieved, but reversed, from the broad control of the budget assumed by the National Congress, indicating emblematic limitations in the institutional reengineering. The consequences of the change in the budgetary constitutional order of 1988 were the significant reduction of the Executive's discretion, the increase of the National Congress' control in budgetary matters, the expansion of the discretion within the Legislative, the transfer of presidential prerogatives to the budget´s general-rapporteur and the explosion of general-rapporteur´s amendments, with the emblematic reversal of equal treatment, indicating relevant cracks in the budget reconfiguration. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the extensive documentation of the processing of annual budget bills and budget guidelines bills available on the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate, as well as in the approved laws themselves (LOA and LDO). In addition, empirical data are used to support part of the conclusions reached in the study.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-11-04
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format preprint
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/4875
10.1590/SciELOPreprints.4875
url https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/preprint/view/4875
identifier_str_mv 10.1590/SciELOPreprints.4875
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://preprints.scielo.org/index.php/scielo/article/view/4875/9458
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Rodrigo Oliveira de Faria
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Rodrigo Oliveira de Faria
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
publisher.none.fl_str_mv SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
SciELO Preprints
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:SciELO Preprints
instname:SciELO
instacron:SCI
instname_str SciELO
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv scielo.submission@scielo.org
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