Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution

• Autor(a) principal: Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan, Sakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215
• topic: coalition presidentialism; budgeting process; singular amendments; political bargaining.; presidencialismo de coalición; proceso presupuestario; enmiendas singulares; regateo político.; presidencialismo de coalizão; processo orçamentário; emendas singulares; barganha política.

The Brazilian budgetary process has historically been questioned based on the alleged use of political bargaining in the inclusion and implementation of amendments from deputies to the executive’s budget, which affects the principles, criteria, and practices of allocative choices. Supported by the theory of coalition formation, this article examines a possible political bargaining relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the budgetary process at the federal level. The study analyzed the execution of amendments from deputies over five mandates (between 2000 and 2017) and the deputies’ votes on projects proposed by the executive. Data regarding the execution of singular amendments were also analyzed, together with information concerning the deputies’ political position toward the executive when proposing amendments. Econometric techniques were employed to correct selection bias, assessing the presence of political bargaining. The results corroborate the hypothesis that there is political bargaining in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Brazil. The deputy who had more of their amendments executed by the government was also the one that voted with the government in the bills sent from the executive to the legislative, even though they were not part of the governing coalition in the Congress. Therefore, the executive targeted deputies who were not part of the governing coalition to increase the number of votes in Congress.