Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
Data de Publicação: 2020
Outros Autores: Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan, Sakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215
Resumo: The Brazilian budgetary process has historically been questioned based on the alleged use of political bargaining in the inclusion and implementation of amendments from deputies to the executive’s budget, which affects the principles, criteria, and practices of allocative choices. Supported by the theory of coalition formation, this article examines a possible political bargaining relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the budgetary process at the federal level. The study analyzed the execution of amendments from deputies over five mandates (between 2000 and 2017) and the deputies’ votes on projects proposed by the executive. Data regarding the execution of singular amendments were also analyzed, together with information concerning the deputies’ political position toward the executive when proposing amendments. Econometric techniques were employed to correct selection bias, assessing the presence of political bargaining. The results corroborate the hypothesis that there is political bargaining in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Brazil. The deputy who had more of their amendments executed by the government was also the one that voted with the government in the bills sent from the executive to the legislative, even though they were not part of the governing coalition in the Congress. Therefore, the executive targeted deputies who were not part of the governing coalition to increase the number of votes in Congress.
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spelling Political bargaining practices through federal budget executionPrácticas de regateo político mediante la ejecución presupuestaria federalPráticas de barganha política por meio da execução orçamentária federalcoalition presidentialismbudgeting processsingular amendmentspolitical bargaining.presidencialismo de coaliciónproceso presupuestarioenmiendas singularesregateo político.presidencialismo de coalizãoprocesso orçamentárioemendas singularesbarganha política.The Brazilian budgetary process has historically been questioned based on the alleged use of political bargaining in the inclusion and implementation of amendments from deputies to the executive’s budget, which affects the principles, criteria, and practices of allocative choices. Supported by the theory of coalition formation, this article examines a possible political bargaining relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the budgetary process at the federal level. The study analyzed the execution of amendments from deputies over five mandates (between 2000 and 2017) and the deputies’ votes on projects proposed by the executive. Data regarding the execution of singular amendments were also analyzed, together with information concerning the deputies’ political position toward the executive when proposing amendments. Econometric techniques were employed to correct selection bias, assessing the presence of political bargaining. The results corroborate the hypothesis that there is political bargaining in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Brazil. The deputy who had more of their amendments executed by the government was also the one that voted with the government in the bills sent from the executive to the legislative, even though they were not part of the governing coalition in the Congress. Therefore, the executive targeted deputies who were not part of the governing coalition to increase the number of votes in Congress.El proceso presupuestario brasileño ha sido históricamente cuestionado por la supuesta presencia de regateo político en la inclusión y ejecución de enmiendas al presupuesto, hecho que interfiere con las premisas, criterios y prácticas de las decisiones distributivas. Este artículo, apoyado en la Teoría de la Formación de Coaliciones, investiga la existencia de una posible relación de regateo político entre los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo en el proceso presupuestario a nivel federal. Dicha investigación se da a través del análisis de las ejecuciones de enmiendas parlamentarias singulares en cinco legislaturas (entre 2000 y 2017) y de las decisiones de los diputados en la votación de proyectos propuestos por el Ejecutivo. Se analizaron datos referentes a la ejecución de enmiendas singulares, así como los referentes a la posición política del parlamentario frente al Ejecutivo al momento de la proposición de las enmiendas. La metodología involucró técnicas econométricas que tratan la corrección del sesgo de selección para evaluar la presencia o ausencia de la referida relación de regateo. Los resultados obtenidos corroboran la hipótesis de existencia de regateo político entre los poderes Ejecutivo y Legislativo, ya que el parlamentario con mayor aporte de ejecución de sus enmiendas singulares fue quien, además de haber apoyado al Ejecutivo a través de votos a favor de los proyectos remitidos al Congreso Nacional, era ajeno a la coalición de gobierno, objetivo del Ejecutivo en la formación del quórum mínimo para la aprobación de sus proyectos.O processo orçamentário brasileiro tem sido historicamente questionado pela suposta presença de barganha política na inclusão e na execução de emendas ao orçamento, fato que interfere nas premissas, nos critérios e nas práticas das escolhas alocativas. Este artigo, sustentado pela Teoria da Formação de Coalizões, investiga a existência de uma possível relação de barganha política entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo no processo orçamentário na esfera federal. Tal pesquisa ocorre por meio da análise das execuções de emendas parlamentares singulares ao longo de cinco legislaturas (entre 2000 e 2017) e das decisões dos deputados na votação de projetos propostos pelo Executivo. Analisaram-se dados referentes à execução de emendas singulares, bem como aqueles concernentes à posição política do parlamentar com relação ao Executivo no instante da proposição das emendas. A metodologia envolveu técnicas econométricas que lidam com a correção do viés de seleção para avaliar a presença ou não da referida relação de barganha. Os resultados obtidos corroboram a hipótese de existência de barganha política entre os poderes Executivo e Legislativo, pois o parlamentar com maior aporte de execução de suas emendas singulares foi aquele que, além de ter exercido apoio ao Executivo através de votos favoráveis aos projetos enviados ao congresso nacional, era de fora da coligação de governo, alvo do Executivo na formação do quorum mínimo para a aprovação de seus projetos.Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)2020-09-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 54 No. 5 (2020); 1361-1381Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 54 Núm. 5 (2020); 1361-1381Revista de Administração Pública; v. 54 n. 5 (2020); 1361-13811982-31340034-7612reponame:Revista de Administração Públicainstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215/78306https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215/pdf_396Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGraton, Luis Henrique TeixeiraBonacim, Carlos Alberto GrespanSakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko2020-10-21T16:13:59Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/82215Revistahttps://ebape.fgv.br/publicacoes/rapONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rap@fgv.br1982-31340034-7612opendoar:2020-10-21T16:13:59Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
Prácticas de regateo político mediante la ejecución presupuestaria federal
Práticas de barganha política por meio da execução orçamentária federal
title Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
spellingShingle Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
coalition presidentialism
budgeting process
singular amendments
political bargaining.
presidencialismo de coalición
proceso presupuestario
enmiendas singulares
regateo político.
presidencialismo de coalizão
processo orçamentário
emendas singulares
barganha política.
title_short Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
title_full Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
title_fullStr Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
title_full_unstemmed Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
title_sort Political bargaining practices through federal budget execution
author Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
author_facet Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan
Sakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko
author_role author
author2 Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan
Sakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Graton, Luis Henrique Teixeira
Bonacim, Carlos Alberto Grespan
Sakurai, Sérgio Naruhiko
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv coalition presidentialism
budgeting process
singular amendments
political bargaining.
presidencialismo de coalición
proceso presupuestario
enmiendas singulares
regateo político.
presidencialismo de coalizão
processo orçamentário
emendas singulares
barganha política.
topic coalition presidentialism
budgeting process
singular amendments
political bargaining.
presidencialismo de coalición
proceso presupuestario
enmiendas singulares
regateo político.
presidencialismo de coalizão
processo orçamentário
emendas singulares
barganha política.
description The Brazilian budgetary process has historically been questioned based on the alleged use of political bargaining in the inclusion and implementation of amendments from deputies to the executive’s budget, which affects the principles, criteria, and practices of allocative choices. Supported by the theory of coalition formation, this article examines a possible political bargaining relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the budgetary process at the federal level. The study analyzed the execution of amendments from deputies over five mandates (between 2000 and 2017) and the deputies’ votes on projects proposed by the executive. Data regarding the execution of singular amendments were also analyzed, together with information concerning the deputies’ political position toward the executive when proposing amendments. Econometric techniques were employed to correct selection bias, assessing the presence of political bargaining. The results corroborate the hypothesis that there is political bargaining in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in Brazil. The deputy who had more of their amendments executed by the government was also the one that voted with the government in the bills sent from the executive to the legislative, even though they were not part of the governing coalition in the Congress. Therefore, the executive targeted deputies who were not part of the governing coalition to increase the number of votes in Congress.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-09-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
language por
eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215/78306
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/82215/pdf_396
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Pública
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista de Administração Pública
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 54 No. 5 (2020); 1361-1381
Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 54 Núm. 5 (2020); 1361-1381
Revista de Administração Pública; v. 54 n. 5 (2020); 1361-1381
1982-3134
0034-7612
reponame:Revista de Administração Pública
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
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instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista de Administração Pública
collection Revista de Administração Pública
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rap@fgv.br
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