Cartéis e Incentivos para o TCC DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v2n1p115-140

• Autor(a) principal: Aranovich, Tatiana de Campos
• Data de Publicação: 2011
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
• Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6
• topic: Law & Economics; Antitrust Law; Cartel; Cessation of Conduct Agreement (TCC); CADE; Análise Econômica do Direito; Defesa da Concorrência; Cartel; TCC; CADE

This article aims at analyzing the Brazilian Cessation of Conduct Agreement (acronymed TCC) established between cartel agents and the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (the Brazilian Antitrust Tribunal, acronymed CADE). First, it is made a brief introduction. Second, it is reviewed the legal framework related to the matter. Third, it is analyzed all TCCs involving cartel signed, since a new act was enacted in 2007 until the September 2010. For assessing such data, three are the main analysis focus: inter-proceedings relations, intra-proceedings relations and incentives issues. Fourth, it is studied the experience acquired by U.S. and the E.C. in settling similar cases, especially through consent decrees and direct settlement. Finally, some conclusions will be dropped from data assessment, particularly with regard to incentives provided to agents for signing TCCs in Brazil.