An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Barbosa, Sanny Diniz
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880
Resumo: The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.
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spelling An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent ProblemGame Theory Law and Economics Principal-AgentThe inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.Universidade Católica de Brasília2022-02-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionMétodo DedutivoAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1288010.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-5562178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880/7670Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBarbosa, Sanny DinizBezerra, Diogo de Carvalho2023-06-15T18:36:59Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/12880Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2023-06-15T18:36:59Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
title An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
spellingShingle An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
Barbosa, Sanny Diniz
Game Theory
Law and Economics
Principal-Agent
title_short An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
title_full An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
title_fullStr An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
title_full_unstemmed An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
title_sort An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
author Barbosa, Sanny Diniz
author_facet Barbosa, Sanny Diniz
Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho
author_role author
author2 Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Barbosa, Sanny Diniz
Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Game Theory
Law and Economics
Principal-Agent
topic Game Theory
Law and Economics
Principal-Agent
description The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02-20
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Método Dedutivo
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880
10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880
identifier_str_mv 10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880/7670
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB
instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron_str UCB
institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
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