An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880 |
Resumo: | The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals. |
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Economic Analysis of law Review |
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An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent ProblemGame Theory Law and Economics Principal-AgentThe inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals.Universidade Católica de Brasília2022-02-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionMétodo DedutivoAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1288010.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-5562178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880/7670Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBarbosa, Sanny DinizBezerra, Diogo de Carvalho2023-06-15T18:36:59Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/12880Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2023-06-15T18:36:59Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
title |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
spellingShingle |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem Barbosa, Sanny Diniz Game Theory Law and Economics Principal-Agent |
title_short |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
title_full |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
title_fullStr |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
title_sort |
An Analysis of the Immediate Liability Law for Building Permits via the Principal-Agent Problem |
author |
Barbosa, Sanny Diniz |
author_facet |
Barbosa, Sanny Diniz Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Barbosa, Sanny Diniz Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Game Theory Law and Economics Principal-Agent |
topic |
Game Theory Law and Economics Principal-Agent |
description |
The inefficiency in the process of obtaining a building permit in Brazil can be mitigated with the approval of new laws that allow a relationship of consideration for services between the public administration and self-employed professionals, especially the architect. A Principal-Agent model is proposed to formalize possible Immediate Liability laws for building permits. The URB-Architect relationship can be formulated through the game theory, and the results following optimal policies ensure a theoretical condition of actions previously carried out by the public sector to be carried out by self-employed professionals. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-02-20 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Método Dedutivo Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880 10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31501/ealr.v12i3.12880 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12880/7670 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 12 No. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 12 Núm. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 12 n. 3 (2021): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 542-556 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798675421088186368 |