Constitutional Economics and Public Choice

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Leister, Carolina
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
spa
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456
Resumo: From the Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem indicating the instability of the majoritarian rules, the theoreticians of Constitutional Economics/Public Choice extend the consequences of this theorem pointing as the decisions politics under majority leading the public sector to become enlarged beyond the constitutional limits fixed for it. The solutions proposed for this expansion must be placed in the proper Constitution, limiting and defining the permissible alternatives to the decisions taken under majority.
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spelling Constitutional Economics and Public ChoiceEconomia Constitucional e Public Choice: a tendência estatal à expansão fiscal e seus limites institucionais DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem. Majoritarian rules. Public finance expansion. Public goods. Finance laws.Teorema da impossibilidade geral de Arrow. Regras majoritárias. Expansão fiscal estatal. Bens públicos. Leis fiscais.From the Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem indicating the instability of the majoritarian rules, the theoreticians of Constitutional Economics/Public Choice extend the consequences of this theorem pointing as the decisions politics under majority leading the public sector to become enlarged beyond the constitutional limits fixed for it. The solutions proposed for this expansion must be placed in the proper Constitution, limiting and defining the permissible alternatives to the decisions taken under majority. A partir da prova formal relativa à instabilidade das soluções obtidas por meio das regras majoritárias proporcionada pelo teorema da impossibilidade geral de Arrow, os teóricos da Economia Constitucional/Public Choice estendem as conseqüências desse teorema apontando como as decisões políticas sob maioria impactam negativamente na atividade fiscal do Estado levando o setor público a expandir-se para além dos limites fixados constitucionalmente para ele e drenando recursos do setor privado. As soluções propostas para esse inchaço estatal devem estar previstas e figurar na própria Constituição por meio da limitação e definição exógena do conjunto oportunidade referente às decisões tomadas sob maioria.Universidade Católica de Brasília2010-06-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por Pares; Peer ReviewedAnálise de Fundamentosapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/145610.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2010): EALR's First Issue.; 116-127Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2010): EALR's First Issue.; 116-127Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 1 n. 1 (2010): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 116-1272178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBporengspahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1109https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1925https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1926Leister, Carolinainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-06-24T16:38:03Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/1456Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2022-06-24T16:38:03Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
Economia Constitucional e Public Choice: a tendência estatal à expansão fiscal e seus limites institucionais DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127
title Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
spellingShingle Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
Leister, Carolina
Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem. Majoritarian rules. Public finance expansion. Public goods. Finance laws.
Teorema da impossibilidade geral de Arrow. Regras majoritárias. Expansão fiscal estatal. Bens públicos. Leis fiscais.
title_short Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
title_full Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
title_fullStr Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
title_full_unstemmed Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
title_sort Constitutional Economics and Public Choice
author Leister, Carolina
author_facet Leister, Carolina
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Leister, Carolina
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem. Majoritarian rules. Public finance expansion. Public goods. Finance laws.
Teorema da impossibilidade geral de Arrow. Regras majoritárias. Expansão fiscal estatal. Bens públicos. Leis fiscais.
topic Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem. Majoritarian rules. Public finance expansion. Public goods. Finance laws.
Teorema da impossibilidade geral de Arrow. Regras majoritárias. Expansão fiscal estatal. Bens públicos. Leis fiscais.
description From the Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem indicating the instability of the majoritarian rules, the theoreticians of Constitutional Economics/Public Choice extend the consequences of this theorem pointing as the decisions politics under majority leading the public sector to become enlarged beyond the constitutional limits fixed for it. The solutions proposed for this expansion must be placed in the proper Constitution, limiting and defining the permissible alternatives to the decisions taken under majority.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-06-06
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
Análise de Fundamentos
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456
10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456
identifier_str_mv 10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v1n1p116-127
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
spa
language por
eng
spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1109
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1925
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1456/1926
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2010): EALR's First Issue.; 116-127
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2010): EALR's First Issue.; 116-127
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 1 n. 1 (2010): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 116-127
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
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instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
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institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
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