DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Alencar, Vinícius Barreto de
Data de Publicação: 2012
Outros Autores: Almeida, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves de, Neto, Luiz Medeiros de Araujo, Amaral, Mariana Rodarte do, Matos, Eduardo Bona Safe de
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão
Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635
Resumo: Through the Agency Conflicts, which analyse costs resulting from the ramification between property and capital control, practices of corporate governance appear. Facing it, some institutions started to act with the intention of stimulating good practices and warrant rights to minor stockholders. There are affirmations that the stocks evaluated with the Corporate Governance Ratings (CGR) would have a different distribution in relation to the dividends of the stocks evaluated with the Bovespa Rating (IBOV), being the dividends higher in the companies with good practices of corporate governance. The objective is to verify if the companies compounding the CGR had distributed the dividends differently and if these dividends are higher than those from companies that are components of IBOV. The study is justified for the fact that, nowadays, there are billionaire volumes in daily negotiation in the BMF&Bovespa, environment in which the investment decision must suffer influence from the governance indicators. Theoretical portfolios from 2006 were collected for both ratings. It was used as proxy the weighted average of the dividend yields of each stock having as weighing the relevance of such stocks inside the ratings. A descriptive data analysis was held, followed by a test of averages between the weighing of the dividend yields of the ratings. Higher dividend yields were found for the IBOV. However, the test of averages led to the conclusion that there is no difference between the dividend distributions, demonstrating that the corporate governance practices do not result in better dividend distributions.
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spelling DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOVGovernança CorporativaTeoria da AgênciaDividend YieldCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryDividen YieldGobierno CorporativoTeoría de la AgenciaRentabilidad por DividendoThrough the Agency Conflicts, which analyse costs resulting from the ramification between property and capital control, practices of corporate governance appear. Facing it, some institutions started to act with the intention of stimulating good practices and warrant rights to minor stockholders. There are affirmations that the stocks evaluated with the Corporate Governance Ratings (CGR) would have a different distribution in relation to the dividends of the stocks evaluated with the Bovespa Rating (IBOV), being the dividends higher in the companies with good practices of corporate governance. The objective is to verify if the companies compounding the CGR had distributed the dividends differently and if these dividends are higher than those from companies that are components of IBOV. The study is justified for the fact that, nowadays, there are billionaire volumes in daily negotiation in the BMF&Bovespa, environment in which the investment decision must suffer influence from the governance indicators. Theoretical portfolios from 2006 were collected for both ratings. It was used as proxy the weighted average of the dividend yields of each stock having as weighing the relevance of such stocks inside the ratings. A descriptive data analysis was held, followed by a test of averages between the weighing of the dividend yields of the ratings. Higher dividend yields were found for the IBOV. However, the test of averages led to the conclusion that there is no difference between the dividend distributions, demonstrating that the corporate governance practices do not result in better dividend distributions.Em meio aos Conflitos de Agência, os quais analisam custos resultantes da ramificação entre a propriedade e o controle de capital, surgem as práticas de governança corporativa. Perante isso, alguns órgãos passaram a atuar com o intuito de estimular boas práticas e garantir direitos mínimos aos acionistas minoritários. Há afirmações de que ações cotadas no Índice de Governança Corporativa (IGC) teriam uma distribuição diferenciada em relação aos dividendos das ações cotadas no Índice Bovespa (IBOV), sendo os dividendos maiores nas ações de empresas com boas práticas de governança corporativa. O objetivo do presente trabalho foi verificar se as empresas componentes do IGC distribuíram dividendos de forma diferenciada e se esses dividendos são maiores que empresas componentes do IBOV. O estudo se justifica pelo fato de que, atualmente, há volumes bilionários em negociações diárias na BM&FBovespa, ambiente em que a decisão de investimento deve sofrer influência dos indicadores de governança. Para a análise, foram coletadas as carteiras teóricas do ano de 2006 para ambos os índices. Foi utilizado como proxy a média ponderada dos dividend yields de cada ação tendo, como ponderação, o peso de tais ações dentro dos índices. Em seguida, realizou-se uma análise descritiva dos dados, seguido por teste de média entre as ponderações dos dividend yields dos índices. Foram encontrados maiores dividend yield para o IBOV, entretanto, concluiu-se no teste de média que não há diferença entre as distribuições de dividendos. Fica a evidência de que práticas de governança corporativa não implicam em melhores distribuições de dividendos.Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina — UDESC2012-06-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; v. 1 n. 1 (2012); 1-11Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2012); 1-11Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2012); 1-112764-7471reponame:Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestãoinstname:Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (UDESC)instacron:UDESCporhttps://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635/2082Copyright (c) 2012 Vinicius Barreto De Alencar, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves de Almeida, Luiz Medeiros de Araujo Neto, Mariana Rodarte do Amaral, Eduardo Bona Safe de Matoshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlencar, Vinícius Barreto deAlmeida, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves deNeto, Luiz Medeiros de AraujoAmaral, Mariana Rodarte doMatos, Eduardo Bona Safe de2022-12-02T15:53:43Zoai:ojs.revistas.udesc.br:article/2635Revistahttps://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/indexPUBhttps://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/oairbceg.ceavi@udesc.br || paulo.barth@udesc.br2764-74712764-7471opendoar:2022-12-02T15:53:43Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão - Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (UDESC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
title DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
spellingShingle DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
Alencar, Vinícius Barreto de
Governança Corporativa
Teoria da Agência
Dividend Yield
Corporate Governance
Agency Theory
Dividen Yield
Gobierno Corporativo
Teoría de la Agencia
Rentabilidad por Dividendo
title_short DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
title_full DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
title_fullStr DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
title_full_unstemmed DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
title_sort DIVIDEND YIELD: IGC VERSUS IBOV
author Alencar, Vinícius Barreto de
author_facet Alencar, Vinícius Barreto de
Almeida, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves de
Neto, Luiz Medeiros de Araujo
Amaral, Mariana Rodarte do
Matos, Eduardo Bona Safe de
author_role author
author2 Almeida, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves de
Neto, Luiz Medeiros de Araujo
Amaral, Mariana Rodarte do
Matos, Eduardo Bona Safe de
author2_role author
author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Alencar, Vinícius Barreto de
Almeida, Ronaldo Schimidt Gonçalves de
Neto, Luiz Medeiros de Araujo
Amaral, Mariana Rodarte do
Matos, Eduardo Bona Safe de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Governança Corporativa
Teoria da Agência
Dividend Yield
Corporate Governance
Agency Theory
Dividen Yield
Gobierno Corporativo
Teoría de la Agencia
Rentabilidad por Dividendo
topic Governança Corporativa
Teoria da Agência
Dividend Yield
Corporate Governance
Agency Theory
Dividen Yield
Gobierno Corporativo
Teoría de la Agencia
Rentabilidad por Dividendo
description Through the Agency Conflicts, which analyse costs resulting from the ramification between property and capital control, practices of corporate governance appear. Facing it, some institutions started to act with the intention of stimulating good practices and warrant rights to minor stockholders. There are affirmations that the stocks evaluated with the Corporate Governance Ratings (CGR) would have a different distribution in relation to the dividends of the stocks evaluated with the Bovespa Rating (IBOV), being the dividends higher in the companies with good practices of corporate governance. The objective is to verify if the companies compounding the CGR had distributed the dividends differently and if these dividends are higher than those from companies that are components of IBOV. The study is justified for the fact that, nowadays, there are billionaire volumes in daily negotiation in the BMF&Bovespa, environment in which the investment decision must suffer influence from the governance indicators. Theoretical portfolios from 2006 were collected for both ratings. It was used as proxy the weighted average of the dividend yields of each stock having as weighing the relevance of such stocks inside the ratings. A descriptive data analysis was held, followed by a test of averages between the weighing of the dividend yields of the ratings. Higher dividend yields were found for the IBOV. However, the test of averages led to the conclusion that there is no difference between the dividend distributions, demonstrating that the corporate governance practices do not result in better dividend distributions.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-06-13
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635
url https://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.revistas.udesc.br/index.php/reavi/article/view/2635/2082
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina — UDESC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina — UDESC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; v. 1 n. 1 (2012); 1-11
Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; Vol. 1 No. 1 (2012); 1-11
Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão; Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2012); 1-11
2764-7471
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão
instname:Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (UDESC)
instacron:UDESC
instname_str Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (UDESC)
instacron_str UDESC
institution UDESC
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão
collection Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Contabilidade e Gestão - Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (UDESC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv rbceg.ceavi@udesc.br || paulo.barth@udesc.br
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