Wills and natural laws: freedom and determinism in comtean positivism

• Autor(a) principal: Lacerda, Gustavo Biscaia
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Mediações - Revista de Ciências Sociais
• Texto Completo: https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/mediacoes/article/view/19818
• topic: Auguste Comte; Determinism; Freedom; Positive will; Augusto Comte; Determinismo; Liberdade; Vontade

In Social Sciences, “Positivism” in general implies naturalism, objectivism and naturalism. To Comte Positivism, however, natural laws are compatible with subjectivity and historicism, because: (1) human intervention in reality is presupposed; (2) Sociology is one of the most complex sciences and, so, one of the most modifiable ones in its concrete applications; (3) Sociology’s position allows it to and even obligates it to modify Natural Sciences’ methods and theories. In this way, there are many connections among Epistemology, Sociology and practical policies, specially through the idea of “freedom of action”, which would imply the dicothomy “determinism-free will.” In such a context, Comtean concept of “positive will” is a way to solve that dicothomy. The concept of “will” was iniatially perceived by Comte as theological-methaphysical, but in his more mature works he introduced the “positive will,” which aim was to design the concrete aspects of human intervention in society and in the world. In these terms, this article presents the main phases of Comtean concept of “will.”