The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Scientia Iuris (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/20060 |
Resumo: | The article aims at demonstrating that, with the modification of the concept of wrongful damage in order to embrace not only the violation of subjective rights but also the injury caused to legitimate interests, the recognition of a new damage category, called the loss of chance, became possible. From this assumption, based on national and foreign doctrines (mainly French and Italian), it analyses the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice’s decisions concerning this issue that were the result of a search realized by the words “loss” and “chance”. For the purposes of the study, all decisions that the central problem was not directly concerned to the theory of loss of chance or it were related to medical liability have been eliminated from the sample. Because of that, the analysis is restricted to the decisions in which the classical loss of chance theory has been applied, meaning the cases in which there is a frustration of an aleatory process at the end of which there would be an advantage or the possibility to avoid a loss, but noboby will ever be capable of knowing the final result. This approach highlights, thus, how has been the theory acceptation in the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice and punctuates the successes and misconceptions of the comprehension and characterization of this new type of damage. Furthermore, it also demonstrates there is no concurrency in the Superior Court of Justice, whose decisions sometimes do not admit the compensation for the loss of chance; every now and then, although they recognize the loss of chance as a new type of damage, they characterize it as consequential damages or lost profits or, instead, only as aggregating the value of moral damage. |
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The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehensionA perda da chance na jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça – os (des)caminhos de uma compreensão teóricaDamage. Legitimate interest. Loss of chance. JurisprudenceSuperior Court of Justice.DanoInteresse legítimoPerda da chanceJurisprudênciaSuperior Tribunal de Justiça.The article aims at demonstrating that, with the modification of the concept of wrongful damage in order to embrace not only the violation of subjective rights but also the injury caused to legitimate interests, the recognition of a new damage category, called the loss of chance, became possible. From this assumption, based on national and foreign doctrines (mainly French and Italian), it analyses the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice’s decisions concerning this issue that were the result of a search realized by the words “loss” and “chance”. For the purposes of the study, all decisions that the central problem was not directly concerned to the theory of loss of chance or it were related to medical liability have been eliminated from the sample. Because of that, the analysis is restricted to the decisions in which the classical loss of chance theory has been applied, meaning the cases in which there is a frustration of an aleatory process at the end of which there would be an advantage or the possibility to avoid a loss, but noboby will ever be capable of knowing the final result. This approach highlights, thus, how has been the theory acceptation in the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice and punctuates the successes and misconceptions of the comprehension and characterization of this new type of damage. Furthermore, it also demonstrates there is no concurrency in the Superior Court of Justice, whose decisions sometimes do not admit the compensation for the loss of chance; every now and then, although they recognize the loss of chance as a new type of damage, they characterize it as consequential damages or lost profits or, instead, only as aggregating the value of moral damage.Demonstra como a partir da Sentença nº. 500/99, da Corte di Cassazione italiana, que alterou a noção de dano injusto para abarcar não somente a violação de direitos subjetivos, mas também a lesão a interesses legítimos, tornou-se possível a expansão da categoria de danos indenizáveis e, por consequência, permitiu-se o reconhecimento da ressarcibilidade do dano pela perda da chance. A partir desse pressuposto, baseando-se em referenciais teóricos nacionais e estrangeiros e analisando julgados do Superior Tribunal de Justiça que tratam da temática, demonstra como tem sido a receptividade da teoria da responsabilidade civil pela perda da chance, pondo em relevo os acertos e aparentes equívocos na compreensão e caracterização dessa nova modalidade de dano.Universidade Estadual de Londrina2014-11-23info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/2006010.5433/2178-8189.2014v18n2p93Scientia Iuris; v. 18 n. 2 (2014); 93-1242178-81891415-6490reponame:Scientia Iuris (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)instacron:UELporhttps://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/20060/15396Copyright (c) 2022 Scientia Iurisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMattos do Amaral, Ana Cláudia Corrêa ZuinPona, Everton Willian2015-03-02T11:59:53Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/20060Revistahttps://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iurisPUBhttps://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/oairevistamdireito@uel.br2178-81891415-6490opendoar:2015-03-02T11:59:53Scientia Iuris (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension A perda da chance na jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça – os (des)caminhos de uma compreensão teórica |
title |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
spellingShingle |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension Mattos do Amaral, Ana Cláudia Corrêa Zuin Damage. Legitimate interest. Loss of chance. Jurisprudence Superior Court of Justice. Dano Interesse legítimo Perda da chance Jurisprudência Superior Tribunal de Justiça. |
title_short |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
title_full |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
title_fullStr |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
title_full_unstemmed |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
title_sort |
The loss of chance on the superior court of justice’s jurisprudence – the (mis)directions of a theoric comprehension |
author |
Mattos do Amaral, Ana Cláudia Corrêa Zuin |
author_facet |
Mattos do Amaral, Ana Cláudia Corrêa Zuin Pona, Everton Willian |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pona, Everton Willian |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mattos do Amaral, Ana Cláudia Corrêa Zuin Pona, Everton Willian |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Damage. Legitimate interest. Loss of chance. Jurisprudence Superior Court of Justice. Dano Interesse legítimo Perda da chance Jurisprudência Superior Tribunal de Justiça. |
topic |
Damage. Legitimate interest. Loss of chance. Jurisprudence Superior Court of Justice. Dano Interesse legítimo Perda da chance Jurisprudência Superior Tribunal de Justiça. |
description |
The article aims at demonstrating that, with the modification of the concept of wrongful damage in order to embrace not only the violation of subjective rights but also the injury caused to legitimate interests, the recognition of a new damage category, called the loss of chance, became possible. From this assumption, based on national and foreign doctrines (mainly French and Italian), it analyses the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice’s decisions concerning this issue that were the result of a search realized by the words “loss” and “chance”. For the purposes of the study, all decisions that the central problem was not directly concerned to the theory of loss of chance or it were related to medical liability have been eliminated from the sample. Because of that, the analysis is restricted to the decisions in which the classical loss of chance theory has been applied, meaning the cases in which there is a frustration of an aleatory process at the end of which there would be an advantage or the possibility to avoid a loss, but noboby will ever be capable of knowing the final result. This approach highlights, thus, how has been the theory acceptation in the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice and punctuates the successes and misconceptions of the comprehension and characterization of this new type of damage. Furthermore, it also demonstrates there is no concurrency in the Superior Court of Justice, whose decisions sometimes do not admit the compensation for the loss of chance; every now and then, although they recognize the loss of chance as a new type of damage, they characterize it as consequential damages or lost profits or, instead, only as aggregating the value of moral damage. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-11-23 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artigo avaliado pelos Pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/20060 10.5433/2178-8189.2014v18n2p93 |
url |
https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/20060 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5433/2178-8189.2014v18n2p93 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/iuris/article/view/20060/15396 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Scientia Iuris info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Scientia Iuris |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Londrina |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Londrina |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Scientia Iuris; v. 18 n. 2 (2014); 93-124 2178-8189 1415-6490 reponame:Scientia Iuris (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL) instacron:UEL |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL) |
instacron_str |
UEL |
institution |
UEL |
reponame_str |
Scientia Iuris (Online) |
collection |
Scientia Iuris (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Scientia Iuris (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistamdireito@uel.br |
_version_ |
1799306014740185088 |