Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Arroyo, Gustavo
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
Texto Completo: http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446
Resumo: According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving.
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spelling Solving puzzles in the philosophy of scienceResolviendo acertijos en la filosofía de la cienciametaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation.metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica.According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving.De acuerdo a la mayoría de las introducciones y manuales de filosofía de la ciencia, el principal objetivo de este campo de investigación es describir los métodos y principios implícitos en la práctica de la ciencia. En este texto programático argumento que esta concepción “descriptivista” de la filosofía de la ciencia es errónea. La perspectiva a ser defendida descansa en buena medida en el análisis de un caso paradigmático de análisis en la filosofía de la ciencia: el así llamado modelo nomológico deductivo de explicación científica, propuesto a mediados del siglo 19 por Stuart Mill y respaldado en el último siglo por filósofos como Hempel y Oppenheim. Como quedará claro a lo largo del texto, dos objetivos diferentes (y potencialmente contrapuestos) guiaron la búsqueda de dicho análisis: ofrecer una concepción materialmente plausible del concepto de explicación y elaborar un análisis que fuera compatible con los presupuestos empiristas de estos autores. Lejos de ser descriptiva la empresa puede ser comparada a la solución de un acertijo. El artículo explora además algunas consecuencias que se siguen de concebir la filosofía de la ciencia como una actividad abocada a la solución de acertijos.Universidade Estadual De Maringá2021-08-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/5844610.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 43 No 1 (2021); e58446Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 43 n. 1 (2021); e584461807-86561679-7361reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)instacron:UEMspahttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446/751375152586Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Scienceshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessArroyo, Gustavo2021-09-09T12:25:31Zoai:periodicos.uem.br/ojs:article/58446Revistahttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/indexPUBhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/oai||actahuman@uem.br1807-86561679-7361opendoar:2021-09-09T12:25:31Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
Resolviendo acertijos en la filosofía de la ciencia
title Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
spellingShingle Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
Arroyo, Gustavo
metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation.
metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica.
title_short Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
title_full Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
title_fullStr Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
title_full_unstemmed Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
title_sort Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
author Arroyo, Gustavo
author_facet Arroyo, Gustavo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Arroyo, Gustavo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation.
metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica.
topic metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation.
metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica.
description According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-08-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446
10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446
url http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446
identifier_str_mv 10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446/751375152586
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual De Maringá
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual De Maringá
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 43 No 1 (2021); e58446
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 43 n. 1 (2021); e58446
1807-8656
1679-7361
reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
instacron:UEM
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
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institution UEM
reponame_str Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
collection Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
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