Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446 |
Resumo: | According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving. |
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Solving puzzles in the philosophy of scienceResolviendo acertijos en la filosofía de la cienciametaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation.metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica.According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving.De acuerdo a la mayoría de las introducciones y manuales de filosofía de la ciencia, el principal objetivo de este campo de investigación es describir los métodos y principios implícitos en la práctica de la ciencia. En este texto programático argumento que esta concepción “descriptivista” de la filosofía de la ciencia es errónea. La perspectiva a ser defendida descansa en buena medida en el análisis de un caso paradigmático de análisis en la filosofía de la ciencia: el así llamado modelo nomológico deductivo de explicación científica, propuesto a mediados del siglo 19 por Stuart Mill y respaldado en el último siglo por filósofos como Hempel y Oppenheim. Como quedará claro a lo largo del texto, dos objetivos diferentes (y potencialmente contrapuestos) guiaron la búsqueda de dicho análisis: ofrecer una concepción materialmente plausible del concepto de explicación y elaborar un análisis que fuera compatible con los presupuestos empiristas de estos autores. Lejos de ser descriptiva la empresa puede ser comparada a la solución de un acertijo. El artículo explora además algunas consecuencias que se siguen de concebir la filosofía de la ciencia como una actividad abocada a la solución de acertijos.Universidade Estadual De Maringá2021-08-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/5844610.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 43 No 1 (2021); e58446Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 43 n. 1 (2021); e584461807-86561679-7361reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)instacron:UEMspahttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446/751375152586Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Scienceshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessArroyo, Gustavo2021-09-09T12:25:31Zoai:periodicos.uem.br/ojs:article/58446Revistahttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/indexPUBhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/oai||actahuman@uem.br1807-86561679-7361opendoar:2021-09-09T12:25:31Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science Resolviendo acertijos en la filosofía de la ciencia |
title |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
spellingShingle |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science Arroyo, Gustavo metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation. metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica. |
title_short |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
title_full |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
title_fullStr |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
title_full_unstemmed |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
title_sort |
Solving puzzles in the philosophy of science |
author |
Arroyo, Gustavo |
author_facet |
Arroyo, Gustavo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Arroyo, Gustavo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation. metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica. |
topic |
metaphilosophy; puzzles; philosophical arguments; philosophical assumptions; scientific explanation. metafilosofía; acertijos; argumentos filosóficos; presupuestos filosóficos; explicación científica. |
description |
According to most introductions and textbooks in the philosophy of science, the main goal of this research field is to describe the methods and principles that are implicit in the practice of science. I will argue in this programmatic paper that such “descriptivist” account of philosophy of science is mistaken. The perspective to be defended relies mainly in the analysis of a paradigmatic case of analysis in the philosophy of science: the so called Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation, which was proposed by Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century and endorsed in the last century by authors as Hempel and Oppenheim. As will become clear, two different (and potentially conflicting) goals guided the search of an analysis of the concept of explanation by these authors: to find a materially plausible account of the concept of explanation and to give an account of the concept compatible with their empiricist assumptions. By doing this, their endeavor is far from being descriptive and it can be compared to the solving of a puzzle. The paper explores also some of the consequences that follow from conceiving philosophy of science as puzzle-solving. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-08-24 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446 10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446 |
url |
http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i1.58446 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/58446/751375152586 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual De Maringá |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual De Maringá |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 43 No 1 (2021); e58446 Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 43 n. 1 (2021); e58446 1807-8656 1679-7361 reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM) instacron:UEM |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM) |
instacron_str |
UEM |
institution |
UEM |
reponame_str |
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) |
collection |
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||actahuman@uem.br |
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1799317509791285248 |