Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000100001 |
Resumo: | This article discusses the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches in Brazil with regard to the issuing of Provisional Measures (PMs) by the former. The article contends that the legal ability of the Brazilian Chief of State to issue decrees with the force of law and taking force immediately (i.e., PMs) does not imply that members of Congress have abdicated from their legislative prerogatives in favor of the Executive Branch, as proposed by some authors analyzing the issue. After presenting the most important analyses of the dynamics in the Executive-Legislative relationship, the article aligns itself with the interpretation emphasizing the process of mutual delegation and control between the two powers, contending that the formation of a solid coalition government generates incentives for the Executive to issue PMs that meet the interests of the legislative majorities, and that Congress is also capable of inferring whether such measures meet its interests, by way of an indirect supervisory mechanism known as the "fire alarm". The article proposes that it is possible to view PMs as part of a complex and changing context of delegation within Brazilian Presidentialism, involving neither usurpation nor abdication. |
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Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisóriasprovisional measureslegislative supervision through fire alarm mechanismscoalition governmentsThis article discusses the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches in Brazil with regard to the issuing of Provisional Measures (PMs) by the former. The article contends that the legal ability of the Brazilian Chief of State to issue decrees with the force of law and taking force immediately (i.e., PMs) does not imply that members of Congress have abdicated from their legislative prerogatives in favor of the Executive Branch, as proposed by some authors analyzing the issue. After presenting the most important analyses of the dynamics in the Executive-Legislative relationship, the article aligns itself with the interpretation emphasizing the process of mutual delegation and control between the two powers, contending that the formation of a solid coalition government generates incentives for the Executive to issue PMs that meet the interests of the legislative majorities, and that Congress is also capable of inferring whether such measures meet its interests, by way of an indirect supervisory mechanism known as the "fire alarm". The article proposes that it is possible to view PMs as part of a complex and changing context of delegation within Brazilian Presidentialism, involving neither usurpation nor abdication.Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)2002-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000100001Dados v.45 n.1 2002reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociaisinstname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)instacron:UERJ10.1590/S0011-52582002000100001info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAmorim Neto,OctavioTafner,Paulopor2002-07-24T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0011-52582002000100001Revistahttp://dados.iesp.uerj.br/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||dados@iesp.uerj.br1678-45880011-5258opendoar:2002-07-24T00:00Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
title |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
spellingShingle |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias Amorim Neto,Octavio provisional measures legislative supervision through fire alarm mechanisms coalition governments |
title_short |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
title_full |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
title_fullStr |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
title_full_unstemmed |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
title_sort |
Governos de Coalizão e Mecanismos de Alarme de Incêndio no Controle Legislativo das Medidas Provisórias |
author |
Amorim Neto,Octavio |
author_facet |
Amorim Neto,Octavio Tafner,Paulo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Tafner,Paulo |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Amorim Neto,Octavio Tafner,Paulo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
provisional measures legislative supervision through fire alarm mechanisms coalition governments |
topic |
provisional measures legislative supervision through fire alarm mechanisms coalition governments |
description |
This article discusses the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches in Brazil with regard to the issuing of Provisional Measures (PMs) by the former. The article contends that the legal ability of the Brazilian Chief of State to issue decrees with the force of law and taking force immediately (i.e., PMs) does not imply that members of Congress have abdicated from their legislative prerogatives in favor of the Executive Branch, as proposed by some authors analyzing the issue. After presenting the most important analyses of the dynamics in the Executive-Legislative relationship, the article aligns itself with the interpretation emphasizing the process of mutual delegation and control between the two powers, contending that the formation of a solid coalition government generates incentives for the Executive to issue PMs that meet the interests of the legislative majorities, and that Congress is also capable of inferring whether such measures meet its interests, by way of an indirect supervisory mechanism known as the "fire alarm". The article proposes that it is possible to view PMs as part of a complex and changing context of delegation within Brazilian Presidentialism, involving neither usurpation nor abdication. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000100001 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000100001 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S0011-52582002000100001 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Dados v.45 n.1 2002 reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais instname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) instacron:UERJ |
instname_str |
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
instacron_str |
UERJ |
institution |
UERJ |
reponame_str |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
collection |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||dados@iesp.uerj.br |
_version_ |
1750312647817953280 |