The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947
Resumo: Will one day developed digital computers be able to think in a similar way we human beings do? Or, being independent of technology, will they always be limited to manipulate data without comprehend them? In this work, I will present two opposite conceptions of Philosophy of Mind: the Strong Artificial Intelligence, which responds positively to the first question, as well as John Searle’s critique to this line, which responds positively to the second question. Therefore I will begin the article presenting the famous imitation game proposed by Alan Turing (1950) in order to decide if a machine is intelligent or not. This game is known by Turing’s test. Then I will exhaustively analyze the mental experiment of the chinese room, proposed by John Searle in 1980, which is a strong critique to the Turing’s Test and to the research program of the Strong Artificial Intelligence.
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spelling The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligenceO experimento de pensamento do quarto chinês: a crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial forteTuring’s test. Strong artificial intelligence. Chinese room. John Searle.Teste de turing. Inteligência artificial. Quarto chinês. John Searle.Will one day developed digital computers be able to think in a similar way we human beings do? Or, being independent of technology, will they always be limited to manipulate data without comprehend them? In this work, I will present two opposite conceptions of Philosophy of Mind: the Strong Artificial Intelligence, which responds positively to the first question, as well as John Searle’s critique to this line, which responds positively to the second question. Therefore I will begin the article presenting the famous imitation game proposed by Alan Turing (1950) in order to decide if a machine is intelligent or not. This game is known by Turing’s test. Then I will exhaustively analyze the mental experiment of the chinese room, proposed by John Searle in 1980, which is a strong critique to the Turing’s Test and to the research program of the Strong Artificial Intelligence.Será que um dia serão desenvolvidos computadores digitais capazes de pensar de modo similar ao nosso? Ou será que, independentemente da tecnologia, os computadores digitais estarão sempre limitados a manipularem dados sem compreendê-los? Neste trabalho, apresentarei duas concepções antagônicas de Filosofia da Mente: a Inteligência Artificial Forte (IA Forte), que responde afirmativamente à primeira questão, e a crítica de John Searle a esta corrente, que, por sua vez, responde de maneira afi rmativa à segunda questão. Para tanto, iniciarei o artigo apresentando o famoso jogo da imitação proposto por Alan Turing (1950) para decidir se uma máquina é ou não inteligente, jogo este que ficou conhecido como teste de Turing. Logo em seguida, analisarei minuciosamente o experimento mental do quarto chinês (proposto em 1980 por John Searle), que é uma crítica ao teste de Turing e ao programa de pesquisa da Inteligência Artificial Forte (IA Forte).Universidade Federal do Ceará2010-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 3Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 3Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 31984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947/29666Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFilho, Maxwell Morais de Lima2021-07-24T13:07:26Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/18947Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-24T13:07:26Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
O experimento de pensamento do quarto chinês: a crítica de John Searle à inteligência artificial forte
title The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
spellingShingle The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima
Turing’s test. Strong artificial intelligence. Chinese room. John Searle.
Teste de turing. Inteligência artificial. Quarto chinês. John Searle.
title_short The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
title_full The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
title_fullStr The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
title_full_unstemmed The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
title_sort The chinese room thought experiment: John Searle's critique of strong artificial intelligence
author Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima
author_facet Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Turing’s test. Strong artificial intelligence. Chinese room. John Searle.
Teste de turing. Inteligência artificial. Quarto chinês. John Searle.
topic Turing’s test. Strong artificial intelligence. Chinese room. John Searle.
Teste de turing. Inteligência artificial. Quarto chinês. John Searle.
description Will one day developed digital computers be able to think in a similar way we human beings do? Or, being independent of technology, will they always be limited to manipulate data without comprehend them? In this work, I will present two opposite conceptions of Philosophy of Mind: the Strong Artificial Intelligence, which responds positively to the first question, as well as John Searle’s critique to this line, which responds positively to the second question. Therefore I will begin the article presenting the famous imitation game proposed by Alan Turing (1950) in order to decide if a machine is intelligent or not. This game is known by Turing’s test. Then I will exhaustively analyze the mental experiment of the chinese room, proposed by John Searle in 1980, which is a strong critique to the Turing’s Test and to the research program of the Strong Artificial Intelligence.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947
url http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18947/29666
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 3
Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 3
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 3
1984-4255
1984-4247
reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
instacron:UFC
instname_str Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
instacron_str UFC
institution UFC
reponame_str Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
collection Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv argumentos@ufc.br||
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