Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Laera, Rodrigo
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/43367
Resumo: If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his place and acknowledge that they would not be aware of his ignorance. In this paper the application of such a principle will be defended, not only with regard to the attributions of knowledge in ordinary contexts, but also with regard to the most demanding contexts.
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spelling Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocenceDerecho a equivocarse: excusas e inocencia epistémicaEspañolEpistemic excuses. Innocence. Pragmatism. Attributions of knowledge.Excusas epistémicas. Inocencia. Pragmatismo. Atribuciones de conocimiento.Inocência. Pragmatismo. Atribuições de conhecimento.If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his place and acknowledge that they would not be aware of his ignorance. In this paper the application of such a principle will be defended, not only with regard to the attributions of knowledge in ordinary contexts, but also with regard to the most demanding contexts.Si un sujeto S atribuye conocimiento ignorando evidencias disponibles, entonces S no será culpable de tal atribución y, por lo tanto, no será epistémicamente irresponsable, cuando: (a) no es consciente de su propia ignorancia y (b) quienes lo juzgan, explícita o implícitamente, se ponen en el lugar de él y reconocen que no serían conscientes de su ignorancia. En este escrito se defenderá la aplicación de semejante principio, no sólo en lo que respecta a las atribuciones de conocimiento en contextos ordinarios, sino también en lo que respecta a los contextos más exigentes.Universidade Federal do Ceará2020-08-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed Articleapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/4336710.36517/Argumentos.24.9Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 24 (2020); 133-148Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 24 (2020); 133-148Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 24 (2020); 133-1481984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/43367/161906Copyright (c) 2020 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLaera, Rodrigo2021-07-22T13:56:54Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/43367Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-22T13:56:54Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
Derecho a equivocarse: excusas e inocencia epistémica
Español
title Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
spellingShingle Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
Laera, Rodrigo
Epistemic excuses. Innocence. Pragmatism. Attributions of knowledge.
Excusas epistémicas. Inocencia. Pragmatismo. Atribuciones de conocimiento.
Inocência. Pragmatismo. Atribuições de conhecimento.
title_short Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
title_full Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
title_fullStr Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
title_full_unstemmed Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
title_sort Right to be wrong: excuses and epistemic innocence
author Laera, Rodrigo
author_facet Laera, Rodrigo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Laera, Rodrigo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Epistemic excuses. Innocence. Pragmatism. Attributions of knowledge.
Excusas epistémicas. Inocencia. Pragmatismo. Atribuciones de conocimiento.
Inocência. Pragmatismo. Atribuições de conhecimento.
topic Epistemic excuses. Innocence. Pragmatism. Attributions of knowledge.
Excusas epistémicas. Inocencia. Pragmatismo. Atribuciones de conocimiento.
Inocência. Pragmatismo. Atribuições de conhecimento.
description If a subject S attributes knowledge ignoring available evidence, then S will not be guilty of such attribution and, therefore, will not be epistemically irresponsible, when: (a) he is not aware of his own ignorance and (b) those who judge him, explicitly or implicitly, they put themselves in his place and acknowledge that they would not be aware of his ignorance. In this paper the application of such a principle will be defended, not only with regard to the attributions of knowledge in ordinary contexts, but also with regard to the most demanding contexts.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-08-03
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/43367
10.36517/Argumentos.24.9
url http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/43367
identifier_str_mv 10.36517/Argumentos.24.9
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/43367/161906
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 24 (2020); 133-148
Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 24 (2020); 133-148
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 24 (2020); 133-148
1984-4255
1984-4247
reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
instacron:UFC
instname_str Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
instacron_str UFC
institution UFC
reponame_str Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
collection Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv argumentos@ufc.br||
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