About knowing what something is
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2010 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942 |
Resumo: | Knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows what X is” are common in everyday language use. In spite of that, the knowledge of what something is has been largely forgotten by the epistemological literature. Our purpose in this paper is to start to remediate that. We will be defending a contextualist account of the knowledge of what something is, characterized by two theses. According to the first, the requirements for one to know what something is may vary given the context in which the knowledge is attributed, on a scale with degrees of strength. According to the second, “know”, when occurring in sentences of the form “S knows what X is”, is a context-sensitive term, being, at least in part, semantically constituted by requirements that may vary according to the context of attribution, on a scale with degrees of strength. |
id |
UFC-17_5df471801f7e7431c628f19155f58f3a |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufc:article/18942 |
network_acronym_str |
UFC-17 |
network_name_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
About knowing what something isSobre o conhecimento do que algo éKnowledge. Epistemology. Contextualism.Conhecimento. Epistemologia. Contextualismo.Knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows what X is” are common in everyday language use. In spite of that, the knowledge of what something is has been largely forgotten by the epistemological literature. Our purpose in this paper is to start to remediate that. We will be defending a contextualist account of the knowledge of what something is, characterized by two theses. According to the first, the requirements for one to know what something is may vary given the context in which the knowledge is attributed, on a scale with degrees of strength. According to the second, “know”, when occurring in sentences of the form “S knows what X is”, is a context-sensitive term, being, at least in part, semantically constituted by requirements that may vary according to the context of attribution, on a scale with degrees of strength.Atribuições de conhecimento com a forma “S sabe o que X é” são comuns em nosso discurso cotidiano. Apesar disso, o conhecimento do que algo é foi, até o momento, esquecido pela literatura em epistemologia. Nosso propósito, neste artigo, é começar a remediar tal esquecimento. Defenderemos uma teoria contextualista acerca do conhecimento do que algo é, caracterizada por duas teses. De acordo com a primeira delas, os requerimentos para que um sujeito saiba o que algo é podem variar de acordo com o contexto em que tal conhecimento é atribuído, em uma escala com graus de exigência. De acordo com a segunda tese, o termo “saber”, quando ocorre em expressões da forma “S sabe o que X é”, é sensível ao contexto, sendo, ao menos em parte, semanticamente constituído por requerimentos que podem variar de acordo com o contexto de atribuição, em uma escala com graus de exigência.Universidade Federal do Ceará2010-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 3Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 3Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 31984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942/29661Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAbath, André JoffilyBarbosa, Eduarda Calado2021-07-24T13:01:41Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/18942Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-24T13:01:41Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
About knowing what something is Sobre o conhecimento do que algo é |
title |
About knowing what something is |
spellingShingle |
About knowing what something is Abath, André Joffily Knowledge. Epistemology. Contextualism. Conhecimento. Epistemologia. Contextualismo. |
title_short |
About knowing what something is |
title_full |
About knowing what something is |
title_fullStr |
About knowing what something is |
title_full_unstemmed |
About knowing what something is |
title_sort |
About knowing what something is |
author |
Abath, André Joffily |
author_facet |
Abath, André Joffily Barbosa, Eduarda Calado |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Barbosa, Eduarda Calado |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Abath, André Joffily Barbosa, Eduarda Calado |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Knowledge. Epistemology. Contextualism. Conhecimento. Epistemologia. Contextualismo. |
topic |
Knowledge. Epistemology. Contextualism. Conhecimento. Epistemologia. Contextualismo. |
description |
Knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows what X is” are common in everyday language use. In spite of that, the knowledge of what something is has been largely forgotten by the epistemological literature. Our purpose in this paper is to start to remediate that. We will be defending a contextualist account of the knowledge of what something is, characterized by two theses. According to the first, the requirements for one to know what something is may vary given the context in which the knowledge is attributed, on a scale with degrees of strength. According to the second, “know”, when occurring in sentences of the form “S knows what X is”, is a context-sensitive term, being, at least in part, semantically constituted by requirements that may vary according to the context of attribution, on a scale with degrees of strength. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18942/29661 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 3 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 3 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 3 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
_version_ |
1797068844979716096 |